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Keywords

plaintiffdefendantstatutetrialzoningzoning variance

plaintiffdefendantdamagesstatutetrialtestimonycredibility

Related Cases

Dowdell v. Bloomquist, 847 A.2d 827

Facts

The plaintiff, Cheryl Dowdell, sued her neighbor, Peter Bloomquist, for planting four western arborvitae trees on his property, which she claimed violated the spite fence statute. The relationship between the neighbors soured after Bloomquist sought a zoning variance to build an addition to his home, which Dowdell opposed due to concerns about losing her ocean view. Following a series of disputes, Bloomquist planted the trees, which obstructed Dowdell's view and significantly reduced the light entering her home. The Superior Court found that the trees were planted out of spite rather than for legitimate privacy reasons.

The plaintiff, Cheryl Dowdell, brought this action in Superior Court alleging that the defendant, Peter Bloomquist, planted four western arborvitae trees on his Charlestown property solely to exact revenge against her, to retaliate by blocking her view, and in violation of the spite fence statute, G.L.1956 § 34–10–20.

Issue

Did the row of trees planted by the defendant constitute a 'fence' under the spite fence statute, and was injunctive relief appropriate?

This is the first occasion this Court has had to address the issue of whether a row of trees may be considered a fence within the meaning of the spite fence statute, § 34–10–20.

Rule

The spite fence statute, G.L.1956 § 34–10–20, defines a spite fence as a fence or structure that is maliciously erected to annoy the owners or occupants of adjoining property.

The spite-fence statute, § 34–10–20, specifically states that a party seeking relief pursuant to its terms 'may have an action to recover damages for the injury.'

Analysis

The court determined that the trees met the definition of a 'fence' under the spite fence statute, as they were planted with the intent to annoy the plaintiff. The trial justice's findings were supported by evidence that the trees were not merely for privacy but were intended to obstruct Dowdell's view. The court also noted that the statute allows for injunctive relief, which was deemed appropriate given the malicious intent behind the planting of the trees.

However, based on the turbulent history between the parties, the provocative statements made by defendant, the notice of trespass letter sent to plaintiff, and the size, timing, and placement of the trees, we cannot say that the trial justice was wrong to give defendant's testimony little weight and to find his claim that the fence was installed to enhance his privacy lacked credibility.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment, ordering the defendant to cut the trees to a height of six feet or remove them entirely, as the trees constituted a spite fence under the statute.

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

Who won?

Cheryl Dowdell prevailed in the case because the court found that the trees were planted out of spite and constituted a violation of the spite fence statute.

Not surprisingly, plaintiff defends the lower court ruling. She asserts that the trial justice had ample authority to award injunctive relief and correctly exercised this authority based on his well-supported finding that the four trees constituted nothing more than a fence erected out of spite.

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