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Keywords

defendantdamagesstatutetrialsummary judgmentappellant
damagesappealappellant

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Durham v. Marberry, 356 Ark. 481, 156 S.W.3d 242

Facts

The appellants, co-administrators of Amanda Lynn Durham's estate, filed wrongful death and survival claims against Harold D. Marberry and Advantage Mobile Homes, Inc. following a collision that resulted in Miss Durham's instant death. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants regarding loss of life damages, asserting that a decedent must have lived for some time after injury to recover such damages. The appellants contended that no such period was necessary for recovery.

It is undisputed that Miss Durham was killed instantly in the accident.

Issue

Whether recovery of loss of life damages under the Arkansas survival statute requires that the decedent lived for some period of time between injury and death.

The issue in this appeal is the interpretation of subsection (b), which was added by the Arkansas General Assembly in Act 1516 of 2001.

Rule

The Arkansas survival statute allows for the recovery of loss-of-life damages as an independent element of damages, and the language of the statute does not impose a requirement that the decedent lived for a period of time between injury and death.

In addition to all other elements of damages provided by law, a decedent's estate may recover for the decedent's loss of life as an independent element of damages.

Analysis

The court analyzed the language of the Arkansas survival statute, particularly subsection (b), which explicitly allows for loss-of-life damages as a separate element. The court noted that the term 'loss of life' inherently implies that it can only be recognized post-death, and thus, the requirement for a period of life between injury and death was unfounded. The court emphasized that the legislature intended to allow recovery for loss of life without such a temporal condition.

By its ordinary meaning in common parlance, 'loss of life' cannot occur prior to death because it necessarily presupposes death has occurred.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case, holding that it is not necessary for a decedent to have lived for a period of time between injury and death to recover loss-of-life damages under the Arkansas survival statute.

Therefore, we hold that it is not necessary for a decedent to live for a period of time between injury and death in order to recover loss-of-life damages under Ark.Code Ann. § 16–62–101(b).

Who won?

The appellants prevailed in the case because the Supreme Court agreed with their interpretation of the Arkansas survival statute, allowing for recovery of loss-of-life damages without the requirement of a period of life between injury and death.

We agree with the appellants and reverse.

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