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Keywords

statuteprobatedue processstatute of limitations
plaintiffstatuteprobatedue process

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Estate of Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 86, 56 A.L.R.4th 451

Facts

Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, Inc. provided medical services to Leo A. Busch before his death. Following his death, the probate court of Greene County commenced the administration of Busch's estate, publishing notice of letters of administration on August 11, 1983. The clinic filed a claim against the estate on July 30, 1984, but it was rejected as being barred by the nonclaim statute, which requires claims to be filed within six months of the first published notice.

Administration of Busch's estate was commenced in the probate court of Greene County and notice of letters of administration and notice to creditors was first published August 11, 1983. On July 30, 1984, plaintiff filed a claim against the estate but it was rejected as being barred by § 473.360.

Issue

Whether a creditor may constitutionally be barred from a claim against a decedent's estate when the only notice given is publication notice in accordance with the nonclaim statute.

The issue raised is whether a creditor may constitutionally be barred when the only notice given of the appointment of a personal representative for decedent's estate is publication notice in accordance with § 473.033, RSMo 1978.

Rule

The due process clause does not require more than publication notice to a creditor that a decedent's estate is being administered, and the notice provisions of the nonclaim statute are constitutional.

The due process clause does not require any more than publication notice to a creditor that a decedent's estate is being administered, and that the notice provisions of § 473.360, RSMo 1978 and § 473.033, RSMo 1978 are constitutional.

Analysis

The court analyzed the application of the nonclaim statute and determined that the notice provided was sufficient under the due process requirements. It distinguished the nature of the rights affected by the nonclaim statute from those in cases like Mullane, where actual property rights were at stake. The court concluded that the nonclaim statute serves a different function and does not require the same level of notice as adjudicatory proceedings.

However, we do not believe this doctrine requiring more notice than that afforded by publication should be applied to notice under nonclaim statutes. The function served by notice is different, as is the nature of the right being affected.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the lower court's ruling, concluding that the notice provisions of the nonclaim statute are constitutional and that the creditor's claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

We conclude that the due process clause does not require any more than publication notice to a creditor that a decedent's estate is being administered, and that the notice provisions of § 473.360, RSMo 1978 and § 473.033, RSMo 1978 are constitutional.

Who won?

The estate prevailed in the case because the court upheld the constitutionality of the nonclaim statute and the sufficiency of publication notice.

The court's reasoning was that the nonclaim statute, and its potential for barring a creditor's claim, does not constitute an adjudicatory proceeding.

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