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Keywords

defendantappealtrialmotion
defendantappealtrialmotioncriminal procedure

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Ex parte Blake, 469 So.2d 1301

Facts

Petitioner Blake was indicted on January 28, 1982, but his trial did not occur until August 11, 1983, resulting in a delay of 19½ months. The delays were primarily due to the State's requests for continuances, which were often based on the desire to consolidate trials with co-defendants. Blake objected to these delays and filed motions for a speedy trial, but the trial court granted the State's requests, leading to the eventual trial and conviction.

Petitioner was indicted on January 28, 1982. His trial was not until August 11, 1983. The various reasons and dates of petitioner's 19½ months' trial delay, as set forth by the Court of Criminal Appeals, 469 So.2d 1291, are as follows: 'December 21, 1984-Blake was arrested for first degree robbery.'

Issue

Whether petitioner was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial due to the delays caused by the State's motions for continuance.

We granted certiorari in this case to review the issue of whether petitioner was denied his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.

Rule

The court applied the Barker v. Wingo four-part balancing test, which considers the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant.

In reaching its determination, the Court of Criminal Appeals applied the Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), four-part balancing test, which requires an inquiry into the following: (1) length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.

Analysis

The court found that while the total delay attributable to the State was 9½ months, Blake had not shown substantial prejudice resulting from this delay. The court noted that the State's actions were aimed at consolidating trials for strategic reasons, but this did not rise to a constitutional violation of Blake's right to a speedy trial.

The Court of Criminal Appeals found that a significant portion of the trial delay occurred as a direct result of the state's attempt to implement its trial strategy. Four of the state's motions for continuance were grounded on its desire to take advantage of the newly promulgated Rule 15.4(b) of the Alabama Temporary Rules of Criminal Procedure, providing that separately indicted defendants may, under some circumstances, be joined for trial.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals, concluding that Blake's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated despite the delays.

The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that 'because the total delay attributable to the state was only 9½ months and because Blake had shown no substantial prejudice, his sixth amendment rights were not violated.'

Who won?

The State prevailed in the case because the court found that the delays, while significant, did not result in substantial prejudice to Blake's defense.

The Court of Criminal Appeals found that a significant portion of the trial delay occurred as a direct result of the state's attempt to implement its trial strategy.

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