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Keywords

plaintiffnegligenceliabilitystatutewillduty of care
tortplaintiffdefendantliabilityappealtrialmotionwillduty of caremotion to dismiss

Related Cases

Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394

Facts

On March 1, 1991, James Hillis and Donna Blankenship were drinking at a bar in Elkton, Tennessee. Chief William Adams approached Blankenship and determined she was too intoxicated to drive, but allowed Hillis, who was also intoxicated, to drive her car. Approximately one hour later, Hillis collided head-on with another vehicle, resulting in serious injuries to Kimberly Ezell and the death of her husband. Ezell subsequently sued the City of Elkton and Chief Adams, alleging negligence for failing to arrest the intoxicated driver.

On March 1, 1991, James Hillis and Donna Blankenship were drinking at the Boondocks' Saloon in the City of Elkton in Giles County, Tennessee. At approximately 8:45 p.m., Blankenship left the bar and entered her automobile in the parking lot of the Boondocks' Saloon. She was approached by Chief William Adams of the Elkton Police Department, who asked her to step out of the car. When Blankenship stepped out of the car, Chief Adams concluded that she was too intoxicated to drive. At that point, Hillis came out of the bar and volunteered to drive Blankenship home in her car. According to the plaintiff's complaint, Chief Adams allowed Hillis to drive away in the car when he knew, or should have known, that Hillis was also intoxicated.

Issue

Whether a police officer owes a duty of care to a third party injured by a drunk driver whom the police officer has failed to arrest.

The issue presented in this appeal is whether a police officer owes a duty of care to a third party injured by a drunk driver whom the police officer has failed to arrest.

Rule

The public duty doctrine shields public employees from liability for injuries caused by their failure to act in a public capacity, as their duty is owed to the public at large rather than to individual members of the public.

Relying upon the public duty doctrine which shields public employees from such actions, the trial court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the Court of Appeals—in a split decision—affirmed the dismissal.

Analysis

The court applied the public duty doctrine, determining that Chief Adams did not owe a special duty to the plaintiff. The court found that the allegations did not support the existence of a special relationship that would create a duty of care beyond that owed to the general public. The court also noted that the statutes cited by the plaintiff did not impose a mandatory duty to arrest every suspected drunk driver.

The public duty doctrine originated at common-law and shields a public employee from suits for injuries that are caused by the public employee's breach of a duty owed to the public at large.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against Chief Adams and the City of Elkton, concluding that the public duty doctrine was applicable and that the plaintiff failed to establish a special duty.

We conclude that the public duty doctrine survived enactment of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, and that sound public policy supports its continued application in Tennessee, as well as the continuing validity of the 'special-duty' of care exception to the doctrine.

Who won?

The City of Elkton and Chief Adams prevailed in the case because the court upheld the public duty doctrine, which protects public officials from liability for negligence in their public duties.

The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, and in a 2 to 1 decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the public duty doctrine was not abrogated by passage of the Governmental Tort Liability Act, and determining that no 'special-duty' of care was owed in this case.

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