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Keywords

attorneyprobationinterrogationrespondentadmissibility

lawyerprobationself-incriminationinterrogationrespondent

Related Cases

Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197

Facts

Respondent, a 16 ½-year-old juvenile, was taken into custody on suspicion of murder. After being advised of his Miranda rights, he requested to see his probation officer. When this request was denied, he agreed to talk to the police and made incriminating statements. He later moved to suppress these statements, arguing they were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights due to his request for his probation officer.

Respondent, at the time 16 ½ years old, was taken into custody by Van Nuys, Cal., police on suspicion of murder. Before being questioned at the station house, he was fully advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona.

Issue

Did the juvenile's request to see his probation officer constitute a per se invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda, and were his subsequent statements admissible?

Whether the incriminating statements and sketches were admissible on the basis of waiver was a question to be resolved on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.

Rule

The court ruled that a request for a probation officer does not automatically invoke Fifth Amendment rights, and the admissibility of statements obtained during interrogation should be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.

A probation officer is not in a position to offer the type of legal assistance necessary to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of an accused undergoing custodial interrogation that a lawyer can offer.

Analysis

The court determined that the California Supreme Court erred in treating the juvenile's request for his probation officer as a per se invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights. It emphasized that a probation officer does not provide the same legal protections as an attorney and that the juvenile's waiver of rights was valid based on the circumstances of the interrogation.

The California Supreme Court found that the close relationship between juveniles and their probation officers compelled the conclusion that a probation officer, for purposes of Miranda, was sufficiently like a lawyer to justify extension of the per se rule.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the California Supreme Court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings, concluding that the juvenile's request for his probation officer did not constitute a per se invocation of his rights.

We hold that it was error to find that the request by respondent to speak with his probation officer per se constituted an invocation of respondent's Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination.

Who won?

The State of California prevailed because the Supreme Court found that the juvenile's request for his probation officer did not invoke his Fifth Amendment rights, allowing the admission of his statements.

The court noted that the probation officer is the employee of the State which seeks to prosecute the alleged offender.

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Keywords

Related Cases

Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166, 57 USLW 4942

Gillett v. State, 56 So.3d 469

Conroy v. State Bar, 53 Cal.3d 495, 808 P.2d 243, 280 Cal.Rptr. 100

Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54, 19 Fed.R.Serv.2d 1499

Appleyard v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 27 S.Ct. 122, 51 L.Ed. 161, 7 Am.Ann.Cas. 1073