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Keywords

lawsuitsettlementappealtrialverdictmotionsummary judgmentfiduciaryfiduciary dutymotion for summary judgment
appealtrialmotionsummary judgmentrespondentmotion for summary judgment

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Feiger, Collison & Killmer v. Jones, 926 P.2d 1244

Facts

George Jones, a former Senior Vice President at an investment company, was terminated and subsequently hired the law firm Feiger, Collison & Killmer to represent him in a wrongful discharge lawsuit. The representation agreement included clauses about settlement negotiations and the firm's right to withdraw. During settlement discussions, Jones rejected an $800,000 offer, which he later accepted under different terms, leading him to claim that the law firm had effectively capped his settlement amount and breached their fiduciary duty.

George Jones (Jones), the respondent/cross-petitioner, was employed by a large investment company as an executive with the title of Senior Vice President until he was terminated by his employer in July of 1990.

Issue

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is an appealable order and whether the representation agreement was void as against public policy.

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is an appealable order?

Rule

The propriety of a summary judgment denial is not appealable after a trial on the merits, regardless of whether the denial is based on a point of law or material issues of fact in controversy.

A denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final determination on the merits and, therefore, is not an appealable interlocutory order.

Analysis

The Supreme Court of Colorado determined that the court of appeals incorrectly reviewed the trial court's denial of summary judgment after a full trial had occurred. The court emphasized that summary judgment is a pretrial mechanism and should not be revisited post-trial. Additionally, Jones failed to preserve his public policy argument for appeal, which further complicated the review process.

In holding that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is an appealable order after trial, the court of appeals distinguished between motions denied on the basis of a point of law and motions denied on the basis of material facts in controversy.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict in favor of Feiger.

We now hold, as a threshold matter, that the court of appeals cannot entertain an appeal of the trial court's denial of summary judgment regardless of whether the denial was based on a point of law or fact.

Who won?

Feiger, Collison & Killmer prevailed in the case because the Supreme Court found that the court of appeals erred in its review of the trial court's denial of summary judgment and that Jones did not preserve his public policy argument.

Feiger petitioned this court for certiorari review of the court of appeals' reversal, contending that (1) the court of appeals could not reverse a denial of a motion for summary judgment after trial.

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