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Keywords

plaintifflawyerappealtrialmotionbench trial
plaintifflawyerwill

Related Cases

Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825, 56 USLW 2190, 8 Fed.R.Serv.3d 858

Facts

The case began in June 1983 when a complaint was filed on behalf of female inmates at the Rockingham County House of Corrections. The plaintiffs challenged the lack of a facility for female inmates that provided programs and services equivalent to those for male inmates. After a bench trial, the district court ruled that the state had violated the plaintiffs' rights and ordered the construction of a permanent facility by July 1, 1989, while also requiring a temporary facility by November 1, 1987, but prohibiting its establishment at the Laconia State School.

This case began in June, 1983, when plaintiffs' appellate counsel, Bertram Astles, filed a complaint on behalf of several female inmates sentenced to the custody of the state prison warden and incarcerated at the Rockingham County House of Corrections.

Issue

The main legal issues were whether the district court erred in denying the state's motion to disqualify the plaintiffs' class counsel due to a conflict of interest and whether the court's prohibition against establishing a facility at the Laconia State School was justified.

The state's theory is that NHLA faced an unresolvable conflict because the interests of two of its clients were directly adverse after the state extended its second offer of judgment on October 21, 1986.

Rule

The court applied the New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 1.7(b), which prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client unless the client consents after consultation.

A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client … unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client consents after consultation and with knowledge of the consequences.

Analysis

The court found that NHLA's representation of the plaintiff class was materially limited by its responsibilities to the Garrity class, which had directly adverse interests. The court determined that NHLA could not adequately represent the interests of both classes without a conflict of interest, leading to the conclusion that the district court abused its discretion by allowing NHLA to continue as class counsel.

NHLA, however, also represents the residents of the Laconia State School who are members of the plaintiff class in Garrity. Quite understandably, this group vehemently opposes the idea of establishing a correctional facility for female inmates anywhere on the grounds of LSS.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order denying the disqualification of NHLA and remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of an appropriate remedy, while affirming the finding that the state violated the plaintiffs' rights to equal protection.

We hold that its order amounts to an abuse of discretion and must be reversed.

Who won?

The plaintiffs prevailed in establishing that their rights were violated, but the state prevailed on the issue of disqualification of counsel, leading to a remand for a new trial on the remedy.

We find considerable merit in this argument.

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