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Keywords

defendantnegligenceliabilityappealtrial
plaintiffdefendantdamagesliabilitytrialtestimonyappellantappellee

Related Cases

Fike v. Grant, 39 Ariz. 549, 8 P.2d 242

Facts

Mary Grant was injured in an automobile accident on October 17, 1929, in Phoenix, Arizona, when a car driven by Volney M. Fike, Jr., the son of the defendants, allegedly operated at an unlawful speed. The car belonged to Irene Fike, the sister of Volney M. Fike, Jr., and was used by the family for business purposes. The jury concluded that Volney M. Fike, Jr. was on a mission for his parents at the time of the accident, which was a key factor in determining liability.

The car was being driven at the time by Volney M. Fike, Jr., a young man seventeen years of age and a son of his codefendants, Volney M. Fike and Sabina Irene Fike. It was alleged and the jury evidently found that the injuries suffered by the plaintiff resulted from the unlawful and excessive rate of speed at which the car was running.

Issue

Did the mention of insurance during the trial constitute reversible error that prejudiced the defendants' case?

The principal contention is that the fact that liability insurance was carried on the car was brought to the attention of the jury by the testimony of one of appellee's witnesses and through no fault of appellants and that this constituted error so prejudicial that it requires a reversal of the case.

Rule

The introduction of evidence regarding liability insurance in a negligence case is generally considered prejudicial and can lead to a reversal if it influences the jury's decision.

The injection by the plaintiff of the question of insurance into a case of this character is error that calls for a reversal.

Analysis

The court determined that the mention of insurance by a witness was not merely inadvertent and could have led the jury to believe that insurance was available to cover any judgment against the defendants. Despite the court's efforts to instruct the jury to disregard this information, the potential for prejudice remained significant, as the jury might have inferred that insurance could satisfy any judgment against the defendants.

The court made a further effort in its charge to the jury to cure any injury that might have resulted from this testimony. After telling it generally not to travel outside the evidence to determine any facts in the case or anything relative to the damages that might be allowed it directed in the following language particular attention to the matter of insurance: 'There was some evidence which was stricken out in this case as you probably recall, a statement made by Miss Helen Grant, the daughter of the plaintiff; it was stricken out as a voluntary statement by her that she went down to talk to these people about their insurance.'

Conclusion

The court reversed the judgment in favor of Grant and remanded the case for a new trial due to the prejudicial effect of the insurance mention.

The judgment is reversed and cause remanded with directions to grant a new trial.

Who won?

The defendants prevailed on appeal because the court found that the mention of insurance was prejudicial and warranted a new trial.

The court determined that the mention of insurance by a witness was not merely inadvertent and could have led the jury to believe that insurance was available to cover any judgment against the defendants.

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