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Florez v. Holder

Facts

Nilfor Yosel Florez, a lawful permanent resident from Honduras, was convicted twice under New York State Penal Law 260.10(1) for child endangerment. His first conviction in 2004 was related to a co-defendant charged with the rape of a teenage girl, while the second conviction in 2010 was for driving under the influence of alcohol with his two young children in the car. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Florez based on these convictions.

Florez is a native and citizen of Honduras, and a lawful permanent resident of the United States. During his time in the United States, the State of New York has charged Florez with a variety of offenses, and convicted him of a few. As relevant here, Florez was twice convicted of endangering the welfare of a child, in violation of New York Penal Law 260.10(1) , for 'knowingly act[ing] in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than seventeen years old.'

Issue

Is the crime for which Florez was convicted–'knowingly act[ing] in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child'–categorically a 'crime of child abuse' for purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act?

The question for the BIA was this: is the crime for which Florez was convicted–'knowingly act[ing] in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child'–categorically a 'crime of child abuse' for purposes of the INA?

Rule

The BIA interpreted 'the term 'crime of child abuse' broadly to mean any offense involving an intentional, knowing, reckless, or criminally negligent act or omission that constitutes maltreatment of a child or that impairs a child's physical or mental well-being, including sexual abuse or exploitation.

In Velazquez-Herrera , the BIA interpreted 'the term 'crime of child abuse' broadly to mean any offense involving an intentional, knowing, reckless, or criminally negligent act or omission that constitutes maltreatment of a child or that impairs a child's physical or mental well-being, including sexual abuse or exploitation.

Analysis

The court held that the BIA's interpretation of 'crime of child abuse' is a reasonable reading of a statutory ambiguity. The BIA's precedential opinions confirmed that the definition includes endangerment-type crimes, which do not require proof of injury to the child. The court found that Florez's conduct under New York Penal Law 260.10(1) met the criteria for a 'crime of child abuse' as defined by the BIA.

The BIA's definition of 'a crime of child abuse' is broad–intentionally so. See Velazquez-Herrera , 24 I. & N. Dec. at 509 ('In view of the fact that section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act is the product of a significant expansion of the grounds of deportability and was aimed at facilitating the removal of child abusers in particular, it is our view that the term 'crime of child abuse' should be interpreted broadly.').

Conclusion

The court denied Florez's petition for review, affirming the BIA's decision to remove him based on his convictions for child endangerment.

We deny the petition.

Who won?

The government prevailed in the case because the court upheld the BIA's interpretation of 'crime of child abuse' as encompassing Florez's convictions for child endangerment.

The BIA's precedential opinions interpreting the INA are entitled to Chevron deference. Mei Juan Zheng v. Holder , 672 F.3d 178, 183-84 (2d Cir. 2012).

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