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Keywords

plaintiffdamagesattorneynegligencemalpracticewillfelonymisdemeanorpublic defenderlegal malpracticedefense attorney

plaintiffattorneymotionmalpracticewillfelonymisdemeanorpublic defenderlegal malpracticedefense attorneygrand jurymotion to dismiss

Related Cases

Foondle v. O’Brien, 346 P.3d 970

Facts

William Foondle was indicted for felony DUI in 2007 due to prior DUI convictions. He claimed that one of these prior convictions was a mistake, but the jury found him guilty of felony DUI. After his conviction was set aside, he was sentenced for misdemeanor DUI. Foondle later sued his public defenders for malpractice, alleging negligence in handling his case, which he claimed led to a longer prison sentence and other damages.

A grand jury indicted William Foondle for felony driving under the influence (DUI) in 2007. The DUI charge was a felony because Foondle had been convicted of DUI twice in the preceding ten years: once earlier in 2007 and once in North Dakota in 1999.

Issue

Did the superior court err in dismissing Foondle's legal malpractice claims against his public defenders?

Rule

A plaintiff who has been convicted of a crime cannot recover damages for legal malpractice related to that conviction unless they can demonstrate actual innocence.

We have recognized significant public policy constraints on the ability of persons convicted of crimes to recover from their criminal defense attorneys for professional malpractice.

Analysis

The court applied the rule by determining that Foondle's conviction for misdemeanor DUI precluded him from claiming malpractice against his attorneys. The court noted that Foondle's conviction stood, and he could not relitigate his innocence in a civil suit. The court emphasized that the public policy principle prevents convicted individuals from shifting the responsibility for their criminal acts onto their defense attorneys.

The superior court granted the motion to dismiss on that basis. The superior court noted, correctly, that while Foondle 'successfully challenged the categorization of [his DUI] conviction as a felony …, the facts of his conduct underlying the DUI charge—whether it be felony or misdemeanor DUI—remain the same: that plaintiff Foondle had committed the criminal conduct of driving under the influence.'

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's dismissal of Foondle's malpractice claims, ruling that he could not demonstrate actual innocence and that his conviction barred recovery.

The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.

Who won?

Public defenders prevailed in the case because the court found that Foondle's conviction precluded him from recovering damages for alleged malpractice.

We hold that the superior court's legal analysis was correct, and we affirm the judgment on that basis.

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