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Keywords

trustwill
plaintiffwill

Related Cases

Fosdick v. Fosdick, 6 Allen 41, 88 Mass. 41, 1863 WL 3330

Facts

Mary Woodbury's will, made in 1857, directed that the residue of her estate be held in trust for her grandchildren, with specific instructions for investment and distribution. After her death in 1860, her daughter Mary L. Fosdick gave birth to another child, which raised questions about the validity of the bequests in the will. The will stipulated that the trust fund would accumulate until the youngest grandchild turned twenty-one, but the court found this arrangement problematic under the rule against perpetuities.

The will was made January 10, 1857, and the testatrix died October 3, 1860. Her daughter Mary L. Fosdick, who was her only child and heir at law, and then the wife of the plaintiff, survived her, having six children, one of whom was born after the making of the will.

Issue

Whether the bequests of the interest and income of the accumulated fund to the grandchildren and the distribution of the fund itself are void due to being too remote and in violation of the rule against perpetuities.

The question which arises upon these provisions of the will, and in relation to which the plaintiff seeks for the instruction and direction of the court, is, whether these several bequests of the interest and income of the accumulated fund to the grand children of the testatrix, and to the several persons who are to receive it, in case of the death of any one or more of them, until the death of the last survivor of the grandchildren, and of the fund itself to the persons described after the occurrence of that contingency, are void as being too remote and in violation of the rule against perpetuities.

Rule

An executory devise is valid if it vests within a life or lives in being and twenty-one years thereafter. If there is any possibility that the vesting may be postponed beyond this period, the limitation is void.

This rule is imperative and perfectly well established. An executory devise either of real or personal estate is good, if limited to vest within the compass of a life or lives in being, and twenty-one years afterwards; adding thereto, however, in case of an infant en ventre sa mere, sufficient to cover the ordinary time of gestation of such child.

Analysis

The court analyzed the provisions of the will and determined that the bequests to the grandchildren were contingent upon events that could extend beyond the permissible time frame set by the rule against perpetuities. Specifically, the birth of a grandchild after the testatrix's death created uncertainty regarding when the trust fund would be established and when the income would be distributed, leading to the conclusion that the bequests were too remote.

It is a necessary and inevitable implication from these provisions concerning the annual payment of the annual interest and income of the accumulated fund, that no portion of it will or can become payable to any one of the legatees until the end of one year after the fund itself is created and established; for no annual interest can before that time have accrued upon it.

Conclusion

The court concluded that all bequests made by Mary Woodbury regarding the income and principal of the accumulated fund were void, resulting in the residue of her estate being treated as intestate property.

It has been shown that all the bequests made by her of the income and interest of the accumulated fund are void, because they are in violation of the rule against perpetuities.

Who won?

The prevailing party was the estate of Mary Woodbury, as the court ruled that the bequests were void and the estate would be distributed according to intestacy laws.

The accumulation directed by her was not intended to be and cannot be construed or treated as an independent provision for the benefit of the former; but the whole scheme was strictly subservient to the other purposes declared in her will, and was contrived and arranged merely for their accomplishment.

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