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Fualaau, Matter of

Facts

Knapik is a citizen of Slovakia who legally entered the United States in June 1995 and adjusted his status to lawful permanent resident in September 1996. In August 2000, he pled guilty to attempted reckless endangerment in the first degree after driving intoxicated at high speeds against oncoming traffic. Following his conviction, the Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS) charged him with removability under the INA due to his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, leading to a removal hearing where the Immigration Judge ordered his removal.

Knapik is a citizen of Slovakia. He legally entered the United States in June 1995. On September 16, 1996, he adjusted his status to that of lawful permanent resident. He resides in New Jersey with his father and sister who are both lawful permanent residents. In August 2000, Knapik pled guilty to the crime of attempted reckless endangerment in the first degree in violation of New York Penal Law 120.25. The plea arose from an incident in which, while intoxicated, Knapik drove at an excessive rate of speed against the flow of traffic on the Staten Island Expressway. He pled guilty, was sentenced to and served four months in jail.

Issue

Whether Knapik's conviction for attempted reckless endangerment in the first degree constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Whether Knapik's conviction for attempted reckless endangerment in the first degree constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Rule

The court applies a categorical approach to determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude, focusing on the elements of the underlying criminal statute rather than the specific conduct of the individual.

The court applies a categorical approach to determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude, focusing on the elements of the underlying criminal statute rather than the specific conduct of the individual.

Analysis

The court found that the BIA did not act unreasonably in determining that New York's reckless endangerment statute defines a crime involving moral turpitude. However, when reviewing the specific elements of attempted reckless endangerment, the court concluded that the crime does not involve moral turpitude because it does not require the intent that is typically associated with such crimes.

The court found that the BIA did not act unreasonably in determining that New York's reckless endangerment statute defines a crime involving moral turpitude. However, when reviewing the specific elements of attempted reckless endangerment, the court concluded that the crime does not involve moral turpitude because it does not require the intent that is typically associated with such crimes.

Conclusion

The court granted Knapik's petition for review and reversed the BIA's order of removal, concluding that his conviction for attempted reckless endangerment does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude.

The court granted Knapik's petition for review and reversed the BIA's order of removal, concluding that his conviction for attempted reckless endangerment does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude.

Who won?

Knapik prevailed in the case because the court found that his conviction for attempted reckless endangerment did not meet the criteria for moral turpitude as defined by the INA.

Knapik prevailed in the case because the court found that his conviction for attempted reckless endangerment did not meet the criteria for moral turpitude as defined by the INA.

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