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Keywords

corporationlevydeclaratory judgment
corporationlevy

Related Cases

Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 116 S.Ct. 848, 133 L.Ed.2d 796, 64 USLW 4088, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1118, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1867

Facts

Fulton Corporation, a North Carolina company, owned stock in several corporations, most of which did not conduct business in North Carolina and were not subject to the state's corporate income tax. The intangibles tax imposed on Fulton's stock was based on a taxable percentage deduction that reflected the corporation's income subject to North Carolina tax. Fulton sought a declaratory judgment that the tax scheme violated the Commerce Clause and requested a refund for the tax paid on stock in out-of-state corporations.

Fulton Corporation, a North Carolina company, owned stock in several corporations, most of which did not conduct business in North Carolina and were not subject to the state's corporate income tax.

Issue

Does North Carolina's intangibles tax on corporate stock owned by state residents, which is inversely proportional to the corporation's exposure to the state's income tax, violate the Commerce Clause?

Does North Carolina's intangibles tax on corporate stock owned by state residents, which is inversely proportional to the corporation's exposure to the state's income tax, violate the Commerce Clause?

Rule

State laws that discriminate against interstate commerce are virtually per se invalid unless they can be justified as compensatory taxes that make interstate commerce bear a burden already borne by intrastate commerce.

State laws discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are “virtually per se invalid.”

Analysis

The court found that North Carolina's intangibles tax was facially discriminatory against interstate commerce. The Secretary of Revenue's argument that the tax compensated for the burden of the corporate income tax was rejected because the Secretary failed to identify a specific intrastate tax burden that justified the compensatory levy. Additionally, the court noted that the tax on interstate commerce did not approximate the tax on intrastate commerce, and the events taxed were not substantially equivalent.

The court found that North Carolina's intangibles tax was facially discriminatory against interstate commerce. The Secretary of Revenue's argument that the tax compensated for the burden of the corporate income tax was rejected because the Secretary failed to identify a specific intrastate tax burden that justified the compensatory levy.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision, holding that the intangibles tax discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Supreme Court reversed the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision, holding that the intangibles tax discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Who won?

Fulton Corporation prevailed in the case as the Supreme Court ruled that the intangibles tax was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.

Fulton Corporation prevailed in the case as the Supreme Court ruled that the intangibles tax was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.

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