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Garcia-Mendoza v. Holder

Facts

Enrique Garcia-Mendoza, a native of Mexico, was admitted to the U.S. as a temporary visitor in 1996 but overstayed his visa. In 2010, he was arrested for DUI and leaving the scene of an accident, leading to a total of 104 days of pretrial confinement. After pleading guilty, he was sentenced to 270 days, with credit for time served, resulting in a total of 197 days of confinement. Following his release, he was taken into custody by the Department of Homeland Security, which initiated removal proceedings against him. The Immigration Judge denied his request for cancellation of removal, citing his confinement exceeding 180 days.

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. He was admitted in January 1996 as a temporary visitor for six months, but he remained in the United States beyond that time without authorization. In 2010, he was arrested and charged with driving under the influence and leaving the scene of an accident. He could not afford bond and remained confined during his pretrial criminal proceedings for a total of 104 days.

Issue

Whether the BIA correctly determined that Garcia-Mendoza was statutorily barred from establishing good moral character under 8 U.S.C. 1101(f)(7) due to his period of confinement exceeding 180 days.

The issue presented for review is whether the BIA correctly determined that petitioner is statutorily barred under 1101(f)(7) from establishing good moral character and is therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal under 1229b(b)(1).

Rule

Under 8 U.S.C. 1101(f)(7), an alien cannot establish good moral character if they have been confined, as a result of conviction, to a penal institution for an aggregate period of 180 days or more.

An applicant cannot establish 'good moral character' if he has 'been confined, as a result of conviction, to a penal institution for an aggregate period of [**5] one hundred and eighty days or more.'

Analysis

The court agreed with the BIA's interpretation that the actual period of confinement, rather than the ordered term of imprisonment, is determinative under 1101(f)(7). The BIA found that Garcia-Mendoza had served more than 180 days in confinement due to his conviction, and the nunc pro tunc modification did not alter this fact. The court noted that pretrial confinement credited towards a later sentence is included in the calculation of confinement under the statute.

We agree with the BIA that the statutory language is clear on this issue, and therefore we need not proceed to the second Chevron step. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. In 1101(f)(7), Congress intended to bar aliens from establishing good moral character when an alien was 'confined, as a result of [a] conviction,' for 180 days or more.

Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit denied Garcia-Mendoza's petition for review, affirming the BIA's decision that he could not establish good moral character due to his confinement exceeding 180 days.

The BIA concluded that petitioner could not establish the requisite good moral character for cancellation of removal because he 'had actually already served a lawful period of confinement in excess of 180 days as a result of a conviction,' and the sentencing court's entry of a nunc pro tunc order at petitioner's request shortening the ordered sentence did not impact the calculation of petitioner's 180-day confinement period.

Who won?

The Board of Immigration Appeals prevailed, as the court upheld its decision that Garcia-Mendoza was ineligible for cancellation of removal due to his confinement exceeding 180 days.

The BIA concluded that the state court's nunc pro tunc sentence modification had no impact on calculating the 180-day period of confinement for the good-moral-character provision in 1101(f)(7) because petitioner 'had actually already served a period of confinement in excess of 180 days as a result of a lawful conviction, prior to the Colorado sentencing judge's amendment of his sentence.'

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