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Keywords

plaintiffdefendantlitigationhearingregulationclass actionparoledue processinternational lawnaturalizationliens

plaintiffdefendanthearingclass actionparoledue processinternational lawliens

Related Cases

Garcia-Mir v. Meese

Facts

Plaintiff Cuban refugees arrived in the United States as part of a mass freedom flotilla. They brought a class action against defendant government officials, in consolidated cases, after they were detained as unadmitted and excludable or because their general parole had been revoked. Plaintiffs were accorded special parole status by the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980 (REAA), Pub. L. No. 96-422, 94 Stat. 1799. After extensive litigation, the government was ordered to prepare and implement a plan to provide individual parole revocation hearings for unadmitted aliens upon a finding that, while international law was inapplicable, they had presented a claim of denial of a nonconstitutionally-based liberty interest in a parole hearing, protected by U.S. Const. amend. V.

Issue

The main legal issue was whether unadmitted aliens could claim the protection of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution to secure parole revocation hearings.

These cases pose the question whether unadmitted aliens properly may claim the protection of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution to secure parole revocation hearings.

Rule

The court determined that, for unadmitted aliens, the right to parole revocation hearings is not resident in the core values of the Due Process Clause per se, and that no actionable liberty interest exists based on nonconstitutionally-based claims.

We earlier determined that, for unadmitted aliens, the right to such hearings is not resident in the core values of the Due Process Clause per se.

Analysis

The court applied the rule by examining whether the plaintiffs had a nonconstitutionally-based liberty interest. It concluded that the general Immigration and Naturalization Service regulations regarding parole did not create a liberty interest, and that the President's public statements and the creation of a special parole category did not impose substantive limitations on executive discretion sufficient to establish such an interest.

The court further determined that the President's 'open arms' invitation, coupled with the creation of the special 'Cuban/Haitian Entrant (Status Pending)' parole category, evidenced the existence of restrictions on the discretion of executive actors sufficient to constitute an actionable liberty interest in continued parole. This was error.

Conclusion

The order was affirmed in part and reversed in part because international law was not applicable and because no liberty interest in a parole hearing was created by public statements of the President of the United States or by the statutory creation of a special parole category for Mariel Cuban refugees.

The order was affirmed in part and reversed in part because international law was not applicable and because no liberty interest in a parole hearing was created by public statements of the President of the United States effectively inviting them to come to the United States or by the statutory creation of a special parole category for Mariel Cuban refugees.

Who won?

The government prevailed in the case because the court found that the plaintiffs did not have a nonconstitutionally-based liberty interest in parole hearings.

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