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Keywords

contractlawsuittestimonytrustwillconstructive trust

contractplaintiffdefendantattorneylawyertestimonymotionsummary judgmenttrustwillmotion for summary judgmentconstructive trust

Related Cases

Garrett v. Read, 278 Kan. 662, 102 P.3d 436

Facts

John Humble and Sarah Puffinbarger executed nearly identical wills in 1984, which provided for the distribution of their estate to their children and grandchildren. After John's death in 1984, Sarah executed a new will in 1993 that altered the distribution, disinheriting John's children. John's children filed a lawsuit seeking a constructive trust on a portion of Sarah's estate, arguing that the 1984 wills were contractual and that Sarah could not change the distribution agreed upon in those wills.

In 1984, lawyer Timothy Fielder prepared nearly identical wills for Sarah and John. Each will first directed that any funeral expenses and debts be paid from the estate. Each will also provided that one of Sarah's daughters would receive a grandfather clock. The remaining estate was bequeathed to the surviving spouse 'absolutely.' If one spouse predeceased the other, or if the spouses died at the same time, each will provided that the rest of the estate was to be divided into sevenths.

Issue

Did the District Court err in admitting parol evidence regarding the existence of an agreement between the testators, and in concluding that the wills were contractual, thereby justifying the imposition of a constructive trust?

This dispute over the wills of the parents in a blended family requires us to decide whether the district court erred in (1) admitting a scrivener attorney's testimony about a contemporaneous oral agreement between the parents; (2) holding that the wills were contractual, rendering a later will executed by the surviving parent ineffective; and (3) imposing a constructive trust on the estate property or proceeds.

Rule

The court held that parol evidence is admissible to show that separate wills executed by testators were made pursuant to an agreement, and that a will can be both contractual and testamentary in nature. A constructive trust can be imposed when there is a breach of a legal or equitable duty arising from a confidential relationship.

A constructive trust arises wherever the circumstances under which property was acquired make it inequitable that it should be retained by the person who holds the legal title.

Analysis

The court applied the rule by determining that the evidence presented, including the testimony of the scrivener, supported the existence of a mutual agreement between John and Sarah regarding the distribution of their estate. The court found that the 1984 wills were contractual in nature, and that Sarah's later will violated the terms of that agreement, justifying the imposition of a constructive trust.

The district court found that there was an agreement between John and Sarah regarding distribution of their property after the death of the survivor. The relationship between spouses qualifies as a confidential relationship. In addition, this confidential relationship was based on John's trust in Sarah to distribute four-sevenths of the estate to his children.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's ruling, holding that the 1984 wills were contractual and that Sarah breached her duty to John's children by executing the 1993 will. The imposition of a constructive trust was deemed appropriate.

The district court properly imposed a constructive trust.

Who won?

John Humble's children prevailed in the case because the court found that the 1984 wills were contractual and that Sarah had breached her duty to them by altering the distribution in her later will.

The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, denied defendants' motion for summary judgment, and denied third-party plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

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