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Keywords

lawsuitdefendantnegligenceliabilitytrialjury instructions

negligenceliabilityappealtrialverdictmotioncharacter evidencejury instructions

Related Cases

George v. Estate of Baker, 724 N.W.2d 1

Facts

On March 14, 2002, Gonkartee Dekpah was a passenger in a taxicab driven by Dennis Baker when the cab fishtailed in inclement weather, crossed the median, and was struck by a tractor-trailer driven by Brian Keith Losey. Dekpah was killed in the accident, leading his brother, Bob Makor George, to file a wrongful death lawsuit against both drivers and their employers. The jury found both drivers negligent but concluded that their negligence did not cause the accident.

Gonkartee Dekpah was killed when the taxicab in which he was a passenger swerved across a median in a winter storm and was crushed by an oncoming tractor-trailer truck.

Issue

Did the jury err in finding negligence without causation, and were there prejudicial errors in the trial that warranted a new trial?

George argues that the jury's finding of negligence but not causation was perverse, that trial errors in evidentiary rulings and jury instructions require a new trial on liability, and that the district court erred by instructing the jury on the life expectancy of a Liberian male.

Rule

The court applies the substantial factor test for causation, where a negligent act is a direct cause of harm if it was a substantial factor in the harm's occurrence. Additionally, the standard of care for common carriers is 'utmost caution.'

The standard that applies to a motion for JNOV is that the evidence must be 'so overwhelming on one side that reasonable minds cannot differ as to the proper outcome.'

Analysis

The court determined that the jury could reasonably find negligence without causation, as the jury may have concluded that Baker was negligent in his driving but that the weather conditions were an intervening cause. The court also found that the erroneous jury instructions regarding the standard of care for Baker were prejudicial, as they could have influenced the jury's causation analysis.

Applying this reasoning to the facts of this case, the jury might have believed (for example) that a reasonable person would have driven no more than 30 miles per hour under the conditions, but that a person exercising the utmost caution would have driven no more than 20 mph, or even would have pulled off the road.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the jury's finding of negligence but reversed the lower court's ruling regarding the standard of care applicable to Baker, remanding the case for a new trial on Baker's liability.

Because we grant a new trial on this error, we need not decide whether the erroneous admission of character evidence regarding Baker's careful nature or of the state's statistical evidence regarding other accidents was also prejudicial.

Who won?

The prevailing party in part was the defendants, as the court upheld the jury's finding of no causation despite the errors identified.

The court of appeals held that the jury's verdict was not perverse and not contrary to the evidence.

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