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Keywords

litigationinjunctionappealcorporationcomplianceregulationdue processappellant
litigationtrialwillzoningregulationdue processappellant

Related Cases

Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, N. Y., 369 U.S. 590, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L.Ed.2d 130

Facts

Appellant Goldblatt owned a 38-acre tract in the Town of Hempstead, where the Builders Sand and Gravel Corporation had been mining sand and gravel since 1927. The town enacted an ordinance regulating dredging and pit excavating, which prohibited excavation below the water table and required compliance with new safety measures. The town sought an injunction against the appellants for not obtaining a permit as required by the amended ordinance, leading to the present litigation.

The Town of Hempstead has enacted an ordinance regulating dredging and pit excavating on property within its limits. Appellants, who engaged in such operations prior to the enactment of the ordinance, claim that it in effect prevents them from continuing their business and therefore takes their property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Issue

Whether the town's ordinance regulating dredging and pit excavating was a valid exercise of the town's police power and whether it constituted a taking of property without due process.

Appellants contended, inter alia, that the ordinance was unconstitutional because (1) it was not regulatory of their business but completely prohibitor and confiscated their property without compensation, (2) it deprived them of the benefit of the favorable judgment arising from the previous zoning litigation, and (3) it constituted ex post facto legislation.

Rule

A regulation that prohibits certain uses of property for the public's health, morals, or safety does not constitute a taking requiring compensation, provided it is a valid exercise of the state's police power.

It is an oft-repeated truism that every regulation necessarily speaks as a prohibition. If this ordinance is otherwise a valid exercise of the town's police powers, the fact that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional.

Analysis

The court analyzed the ordinance's purpose and its implications on the appellants' property rights. It determined that the ordinance was enacted as a safety measure and that the appellants had not met their burden of proving that the regulation was unreasonable or constituted a taking. The court emphasized that the prohibition of further excavation was a valid exercise of police power aimed at protecting public interests.

The ordinance in question was passed as a safety measure, and the town is attempting to uphold it on that basis. To evaluate its reasonableness we therefore need to know such things as the nature of the menace against which it will protect, the availability and effectiveness of other less drastic protective steps, and the loss which appellants will suffer from the imposition of the ordinance.

Conclusion

The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling, holding that the ordinance was a valid police regulation and did not violate the appellants' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

We now turn our attention to the remainder of the lot, the 18 acres surrounding the present pit which have not yet been mined or excavated. Appellants themselves contend that this area cannot be mined.

Who won?

The Town of Hempstead prevailed in the case because the court upheld the validity of the ordinance as a reasonable exercise of police power aimed at public safety.

The trial court held that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the town's police power, 19 Misc.2d 176, 186 N.Y.S.2d 577, and the Appellate Division affirmed, 9 A.D.2d 941, 196 N.Y.S.2d 573.

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