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Keywords

statuteappealmisdemeanor
statuteappealmisdemeanorimmigration law

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Gomez-Perez v. Lynch

Facts

Gomez-Perez, a Guatemalan citizen, entered the U.S. illegally in 1995 and was later placed in removal proceedings after a traffic stop revealed his lack of lawful status. He conceded his removability but sought cancellation of removal based on his long-term residency and family ties in the U.S. However, the immigration judge denied his application due to a prior misdemeanor assault conviction under Texas law, which the judge deemed a crime involving moral turpitude. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed this decision.

Gomez conceded that he was removable, but sought cancellation as a nonpermanent resident under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1). Although his longevity in the United States and family ties meet some of the eligibility requirements for a person to be considered for the discretionary act of cancellation of removal, the immigration judge concluded that Gomez did not meet another requirement because of a prior Texas misdemeanor assault conviction.

Issue

Whether Gomez-Perez's Texas misdemeanor assault conviction qualifies as a 'crime involving moral turpitude' that would make him ineligible for cancellation of removal.

We must decide whether that conviction qualifies as a 'crime involving moral turpitude' that makes Gomez ineligible for cancellation.

Rule

The court applied the categorical approach to determine if the elements of the Texas assault statute matched the federal definition of a crime involving moral turpitude, concluding that only the elements of the offense, not the means of committing it, should be considered.

Mathis resolved a circuit split about when the modified categorical approach can be applied to try to narrow a statute when a court is considering whether that statute qualifies as a certain type of offense under federal criminal and immigration laws.

Analysis

The court found that the Texas assault statute was not divisible and could be committed through mere reckless conduct, which does not satisfy the requirement for moral turpitude. The court emphasized that under the Mathis decision, the focus should be on the elements of the crime rather than the means of commission. Since the statute allows for reckless conduct, it does not qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude.

With Mathis holding that [**10] a statute like Texas's assault offense that merely offers alternative means of committing an offense does not allow application of the modified categorical approach, we are back to the general categorical inquiry about which the parties, the immigration judge, and the Board agree. Texas's assault statute can be committed by mere reckless conduct and thus does not qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude, which requires a more culpable mental state.

Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit vacated the Board's judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration of Gomez-Perez's eligibility for cancellation of removal.

We thus VACATE the judgment of the Board and REMAND for reconsideration of whether Gomez meets the other requirements to be considered for cancellation of removal, and if so, whether he is entitled to that relief as an exercise of the immigration court's discretion.

Who won?

Gomez-Perez prevailed in the case because the court found that his prior conviction did not qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude, allowing him to seek cancellation of removal.

Gomez appeals on two grounds. First, he contends that the Texas statute is not divisible. That would mean that the categorical approach applies under which the Texas assault statute would not be disqualifying because it is not limited to intentional conduct.

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