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Goodwin v. Coddington, 8 E.H. Smith 283, 154 N.Y. 283, 48 N.E. 729

Facts

Matilda E. Coddington died in 1882, leaving a will dated 1869 with codicils, the last made in 1876. The will included a provision that granted her children life estates in her interest in a property at 17 Wall Street, with remainders to their children. After the death of her son Jefferson in 1876, a codicil was added that substituted life estates for her surviving children in place of Jefferson's life estate. The dispute arose over whether this codicil revoked the remainders originally intended for Jefferson's children.

Among the property owned by the testatrix at the time of her death was a three-fourths interest in certain real estate at No. 17 Wall street, in the city of New York, which was disposed of by the following clause of the will: ‘I give, devise, and bequeath to my children, Jefferson, Gilbert S., Clifford, Matilda E., and Louisa, each an undivided fifth part of all my interest in the building and lot known as Number 17 (seventee) Wall street, in the city of New York, being an undivided three-fourths thereof, for the term of his or her natural life; and, after his or her death, I give the same to his or her children, the issue of any deceased child, if any, to take its parent's share.’

Issue

Did the codicil to Matilda E. Coddington's will revoke the remainders originally devised to the children of her deceased son Jefferson?

The question in this case is how far and to what extent this codicil changed the other dispositions in the will with respect to the real estate described therein.

Rule

A codicil will not operate to revoke a previous devise or bequest beyond the clear import of the language used, and the intention of the testatrix should prevail over mere forms of expression.

A codicil will not operate to revoke a previous devise or bequest beyond the clear import of the language used.

Analysis

The court analyzed the language of the codicil and the original will, concluding that the testatrix did not intend to revoke the remainders granted to Jefferson's children. The codicil was interpreted as substituting life estates for the surviving children without altering the original plan for the remainders, which had already vested in Jefferson's children.

The purpose of the codicil was to substitute, after his death, the four surviving children, his brothers and sisters, to the life estate devised to him by the will.

Conclusion

The court reversed the lower court's judgment, holding that the remainders devised to Jefferson's children were not revoked by the codicil, and a new trial was granted.

The judgment and order should be reversed, and a new trial granted; costs to abide the event.

Who won?

Matilda E. Goodwin prevailed in the case because the court found that the codicil did not revoke the remainders originally intended for Jefferson's children, thus upholding the original intent of the testatrix.

We think that the testatrix did not intend to revoke that part of her will in which she devised to the children of Jefferson remainders limited upon his life estate.

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