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Keywords

appealmotioncivil rightsjury instructions

torttrialmotioncivil rights

Related Cases

Grager v. Schudar, 770 N.W.2d 692, 2009 ND 140

Facts

Michele Grager filed a civil complaint against Barnes County and jailer Kevin Schudar, alleging that Schudar sexually assaulted her while she was an inmate at the Barnes County Jail in November 2004. Schudar pled guilty to sexual abuse of a ward, which criminalizes a jailer's sexual act with a prisoner regardless of consent. A jury found that Barnes County was not negligent in supervising Schudar and that Grager consented to the sexual act, leading to the dismissal of her civil action.

Grager sued Barnes County and Schudar, individually and as an employee of Barnes County, alleging that while Grager was incarcerated in the Barnes County Jail in November 2004, Schudar sexually assaulted her.

Issue

Did the district court err in instructing the jury that Grager's consent to a sexual act with jailer Schudar was a complete defense to her civil claims?

Did the district court err in instructing the jury that consent was a complete defense to her tort and constitutional claims?

Rule

Consent is not a complete defense to civil claims for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil rights violations when the actor has supervisory authority over the victim.

One who consents to or participates in the conduct of another cannot recover in an action for the conduct or for the harm resulting from it.

Analysis

The court determined that the district court's instruction providing that Grager's consent was a complete defense was erroneous as it did not consider the context of the power dynamics between an inmate and a jailer. The court emphasized that consent obtained under duress or abuse of power is not valid, and the jury should have been instructed to consider the factors limiting Grager's ability to consent.

We hold the court erred in instructing the jury that Grager's consent to or participation in Schudar's conduct was a complete defense to her claims for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil rights violations.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, stating that the jury must be properly instructed on the issue of consent in the context of the power imbalance between inmates and jailers.

We therefore conclude the court erred in instructing the jury that if Grager consented to or participated in Schudar's conduct, her consent or participation was a complete defense to her claims for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil rights violations.

Who won?

Michele Grager prevailed in her appeal as the Supreme Court found that the jury instructions were incorrect, particularly regarding the issue of consent.

Grager is entitled to a new trial on her negligent supervision claim against Barnes County.

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