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Greenberg v. Sher, 567 A.2d 882

Facts

Greenberg was injured in a car accident in October 1980 and retained attorney Sher to pursue her claim against the driver. They entered into a retainer agreement stipulating that Sher would receive one-third of any recovery. After a lengthy negotiation process, Sher was dismissed by Greenberg in July 1982, shortly before a settlement of $70,000 was reached with the driver's insurer. Sher then filed a complaint seeking his contingent fee, which led to the trial court's judgment in his favor.

On October 30, 1980, Greenberg was struck by a car while walking her dog on 49th Street in Northwest Washington, D.C. On November 5, 1980, she retained Sher and entered into a written retainer agreement providing that Sher would receive one-third of any recovery.

Issue

Did the trial court err in excluding expert testimony and in finding that Sher was dismissed without cause and had substantially performed under the contingency fee agreement?

Greenberg first argues that Sher, as intervenor-plaintiff, was required to prove by expert testimony that he was not dismissed for cause in order to make out a prima facie case of entitlement to the contingent fee.

Rule

An attorney who has substantially performed under a contingency fee agreement may recover the full fee even if discharged without cause, provided they have contributed to the results obtained by the client.

Although courts vary widely on the issue of the compensation due an attorney after discharge without cause, recovery of the full contingency fee is most likely in cases in which the attorney has, before discharge, fully performed, substantially performed, or contributed substantially to the results finally obtained by the client.

Analysis

The court found that Sher had diligently pursued Greenberg's case, despite some delays, and that the evidence supported the conclusion that he was dismissed without cause. The trial court's exclusion of expert testimony was deemed appropriate, as the issues at hand were factual and did not require expert analysis. The court also noted that Sher's actions were consistent with standard practices in personal injury cases.

In reviewing the decision of the trial court, this court 'may not set aside [the] judgment except for errors of law unless it appears that the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'

Conclusion

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Sher, concluding that he had substantially performed under the retainer agreement and was entitled to the contingent fee.

The judgment of the trial court is, accordingly, Affirmed.

Who won?

Sher prevailed in the case because the court found that he had diligently performed his duties under the retainer agreement and was dismissed without cause.

In light of these findings, we cannot say that the court's conclusion that Sher was dismissed without cause is unsupported by the evidence or plainly wrong.

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