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appealhearingdeportationnaturalizationliens
appealhearingdeportationnaturalizationliens

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Guadalupe-Cruz v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

Facts

Petitioners are citizens of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection on December 9, 1989. On October 17, 1996, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) served Petitioners with Orders to Show Cause (OSCs) charging them as aliens deportable under section 241(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). At a hearing on March 28, 1997, an immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioners' applications for suspension of deportation, ruling that they had failed to satisfy the new continuous physical presence requirement (the stop-time rule) set forth in the IIRIRA. Petitioners contended that the IJ improperly applied the stop-time rule before IIRIRA took effect.

Petitioners are citizens of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection on December 9, 1989. On October 17, 1996, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) served Petitioners with Orders to Show Cause (OSCs) charging them as aliens deportable under section 241(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). At a hearing on March 28, 1997, an immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioners' applications for suspension of deportation, ruling that they had failed to satisfy the new continuous physical presence requirement (the stop-time rule) set forth in the IIRIRA. Petitioners contended that the IJ improperly applied the stop-time rule before IIRIRA took effect.

Issue

Did the BIA err in affirming the IJ's application of the stop-time rule before its effective date?

Did the BIA err in affirming the IJ's application of the stop-time rule before its effective date?

Rule

The stop-time rule set forth in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) cannot be applied before its effective date of April 1, 1997.

The stop-time rule set forth in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) cannot be applied before its effective date of April 1, 1997.

Analysis

The court found that the IJ impermissibly applied the stop-time rule to Petitioners' suspension applications, even though the suspension hearing occurred before April 1, 1997. The BIA dismissed the appeal without addressing the IJ's misapplication of the law. The court emphasized that it would not deny Petitioners a remedy for serious procedural error based on conjecture about what might have occurred had the IJ correctly applied the law.

The court found that the IJ impermissibly applied the stop-time rule to Petitioners' suspension applications, even though the suspension hearing occurred before April 1, 1997. The BIA dismissed the appeal without addressing the IJ's misapplication of the law. The court emphasized that it would not deny Petitioners a remedy for serious procedural error based on conjecture about what might have occurred had the IJ correctly applied the law.

Conclusion

The court granted the petition and remanded to the BIA with instructions to remand to the IJ, requiring the IJ to apply the law as it existed at the time of the original hearing.

The court granted the petition and remanded to the BIA with instructions to remand to the IJ, requiring the IJ to apply the law as it existed at the time of the original hearing.

Who won?

Petitioners prevailed in the case because the court found that the BIA erred in not reversing the IJ's decision, which had incorrectly applied the stop-time rule before its effective date.

Petitioners prevailed in the case because the court found that the BIA erred in not reversing the IJ's decision, which had incorrectly applied the stop-time rule before its effective date.

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