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Keywords

habeas corpusfelonyinternational lawdeportation
pleahabeas corpusfelony

Related Cases

Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales

Facts

Guaylupo-Moya, a lawful permanent resident from Ecuador, was convicted of attempted rape in the second degree in 1997. His removal order was based on this conviction, which was classified as an aggravated felony under the IIRIRA, enacted after his crime. He argued that he was eligible for a waiver of deportation due to extreme family hardship, but the law at the time of his conviction rendered him ineligible for such relief.

Guaylupo-Moya was born on March 29, 1931 and is a native and citizen of Ecuador. He was admitted to the United States on January 7, 1970, as a lawful permanent resident and has lived in the United States since that time. He is married to a United States citizen and has children who are also United States citizens. On December 24, 1996, Guaylupo-Moya pleaded guilty to one count of attempted rape in the second degree in violation of New York Penal Law 130.30(1), which makes it illegal to engage in sexual intercourse with a person less than fifteen years old when one is eighteen years old or more.

Issue

Whether the provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) can be applied retroactively to deny Guaylupo-Moya relief under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Whether the provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) can be applied retroactively to deny Guaylupo-Moya relief under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Rule

The court applied the principle that Congress's intent regarding the retroactive application of the IIRIRA is clear, and that such restrictions on relief under section 212(h) apply to individuals convicted of aggravated felonies, regardless of when the crime was committed.

Congress, however, plainly provided that IIRIRA's restriction on 212(h) relief and expanded definition of an aggravated felony should apply retroactively.

Analysis

The court found that Guaylupo-Moya's case fell within the parameters of previous decisions regarding the retroactive application of IIRIRA. It emphasized that Congress explicitly intended for the restrictions on section 212(h) relief to apply retroactively, thereby displacing any conflicting norms of customary international law. The court concluded that Guaylupo-Moya was not eligible for relief under section 212(h) due to his aggravated felony status.

The facts of Guaylupo-Moya's case fall squarely within the parameters of Beharry and require us to confront that decision directly. In doing so, we now find that the Beharry decision, [**5] while commendable for its efforts and concern for human interests, cannot support the remedy it attempted to provide.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the judgment of the District Court, concluding that Guaylupo-Moya was not entitled to relief under section 212(h) due to the retroactive application of the IIRIRA.

We thus find that Guaylupo-Moya is not eligible for section 212(h) relief, and we further find Guaylupo-Moya's additional argument – that it is an impermissible ex post facto application of the law to classify him as an aggravated felon – to be unavailing.

Who won?

The government prevailed in the case, as the court upheld the denial of Guaylupo-Moya's petition for habeas corpus, affirming that the retroactive application of the IIRIRA precluded his eligibility for relief.

The government prevailed in the case, as the court upheld the denial of Guaylupo-Moya's petition for habeas corpus, affirming that the retroactive application of the IIRIRA precluded his eligibility for relief.

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