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Keywords

defendantstatutetrialfelonyparoledue processdouble jeopardy

defendantstatutetrialfelonydue processdouble jeopardy

Related Cases

Hale v. State, 630 So.2d 521, 18 Fla. L. Weekly S535

Facts

Hale was charged with the sale of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell after selling a small quantity of cocaine to a confidential informant. He had a prior conviction for aggravated assault and other felonies, which led the State to seek sentencing as a habitual violent felony offender. The trial court sentenced Hale to two consecutive twenty-five year terms, each with a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence, resulting in a minimum of twenty years before parole eligibility.

The relevant facts show that Hale was charged with: (1) the sale of cocaine, and (2) the possession of cocaine with intent to sell after he sold a small quantity of cocaine to a confidential informant.

Issue

1. Does it violate a defendant's substantive due process rights when he is classified as a violent felony offender pursuant to section 775.084, and thereby subjected to an extended term of imprisonment, if he has been convicted of an enumerated violent felony within the previous five years, even though his present offense is a nonviolent felony? 2. Does section 775.084(1)(b) violate the constitutional protection against double jeopardy by increasing a defendant's punishment due to the nature of a prior offense?

Rule

The court held that the legislature could constitutionally provide longer sentences for criminals who commit felonies and have previously been convicted of a violent felony, and that the enhanced punishment is incident to the last offense alone.

We examine each of these issues in turn.

Analysis

The court applied the rule by examining Hale's prior convictions and the nature of his current offenses. It concluded that the enhanced sentencing as a habitual violent felony offender was justified based on Hale's criminal history, and that the imposition of consecutive sentences was not warranted under the habitual offender statute.

We find that the same principle applies in the instant case. None of the statutes under which Hale was sentenced contain a provision for a minimum mandatory sentence.

Conclusion

The court quashed the district court's decision affirming the consecutive sentences and ordered that Hale's sentences run concurrently, finding that the concurrent sentences did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment.

For the reasons expressed, we answer the certified questions in the negative. We quash that portion of the district court's opinion which held that the United States Constitution does not require proportionality review under the circumstances of this case.

Who won?

Hale prevailed in part as the court ordered his sentences to run concurrently instead of consecutively, which was a significant reduction in the total time he would serve.

Hale asserts that our decision in Daniels requires a reversal of the trial court's imposition of consecutive minimum mandatory sentences.

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