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statuteappealhabeas corpusleasebaildocketrespondent

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Harris v. Commissioner of Correction, 271 Conn. 808, 860 A.2d 715

Facts

Randy Harris filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming he was denied 751 days of presentence confinement credit accrued while held in lieu of bond under two separate dockets. He was sentenced to two concurrent terms of imprisonment on June 16 and June 27, 2000. The Commissioner of Correction calculated his discharge dates by applying presentence confinement credit to only one of the sentences, leading to Harris's claim that he was entitled to credit on both sentences.

The record discloses the following facts and procedural history. The petitioner was placed into the custody of the respondent on October 29, 1997, when he was charged in a criminal information assigned to Docket Nos. CR97–513469 and MV97–372359 (Hartford I). On December 15, 1997, the petitioner was charged with additional offenses set forth in two informations in Docket Nos. CR97–159252 and CR97–159254 (Manchester II). The petitioner, unable to post bond for the Manchester II charges, was held in presentence confinement for 780 days from December 15, 1997, to February 2, 2000, when he was sentenced to a term of two years imprisonment for separate offenses not germane to this appeal (Manchester I).

Issue

Whether the petitioner was entitled to have each of his two concurrent sentences, imposed on different dates, reduced by the same calendar days of presentence confinement credit.

The petitioner commenced this action by filing a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed that the respondent commissioner of correction had denied him 751 days of presentence confinement credit that he had accrued while held in lieu of bond simultaneously under two separate dockets for which he thereafter was sentenced to two concurrent terms of imprisonment on June 16 and June 27, 2000, respectively.

Rule

General Statutes § 18–98d(a)(1)(A) states that 'each day of presentence confinement shall be counted only once for the purpose of reducing all sentences imposed after such presentence confinement.'

General Statutes § 18–98d(a)(1) provides in relevant part: 'Any person who is confined to a community correctional center or a correctional institution for an offense committed on or after July 1, 1981, under a mittimus or because such person is unable to obtain bail or is denied bail shall, if subsequently imprisoned, earn a reduction of such person's sentence equal to the number of days which such person spent in such facility from the time such person was placed in presentence confinement to the time such person began serving the term of imprisonment imposed; provided (A) each day of presentence confinement shall be counted only once for the purpose of reducing all sentences imposed after such presentence confinement.'

Analysis

The court determined that the presentence confinement days could only be credited once, as per the statute. The Commissioner of Correction's method of applying the credit to the first sentence and not allowing it to be counted again for the second sentence was consistent with the statutory language. The court found that the habeas court's interpretation extended beyond the intended scope of the precedent set in Payton v. Albert.

The respondent's allocation of presentence confinement credit in the present case comports fully with the requirements set forth in §§ 18–98d(a)(1) and 53a–38(b). The respondent first credited the Manchester II sentence with 780 days of presentence confinement, which included the 751 days during which the petitioner also was confined under the Hartford II information. Once that credit had been applied to the Manchester II sentence, the days encompassed therein had been 'counted … once for the purpose of reducing all sentences imposed' within the meaning of § 18–98d(a)(1)(A).

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the habeas court, concluding that the petitioner was not entitled to the presentence confinement credit on both sentences.

The court ordered the petitioner released immediately on the condition that he would be remanded back into the custody of the respondent to serve the remainder of his sentence should the respondent prevail in this appeal.

Who won?

Commissioner of Correction prevailed because the court upheld the method of applying presentence confinement credit as consistent with statutory requirements.

The respondent calculated the petitioner's discharge date for the Manchester II sentence by adding four years to the June 16, 2000 sentencing date to arrive at a maximum discharge date of June 15, 2004. The respondent then posted 779 days of presentence confinement credit earned between December 15, 1997, and February 2, 2000, plus one day authorized by Public Acts 2001, No. 01–78 (P.A. 01–78), which yielded a discharge date of April 27, 2002, for the Manchester II sentence.

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