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Keywords

trialcommon law
defendantappealtrialcommon lawappellant

Related Cases

Harrod v. State, 65 Md.App. 128, 499 A.2d 959

Facts

The case arose from a confrontation involving Harrod, his wife Cheryl, and her friend Calvin Crigger. On September 15, 1983, Harrod emerged from a bedroom with a hammer and threatened Cheryl and Calvin, swinging the hammer and throwing it near the child's crib. He later brandished a knife, threatening Cheryl and Calvin. The trial court found Harrod guilty of assault against both Cheryl and the child, despite the child being unaware of the events.

The assault charges arose out of a confrontation among appellant, his wife Cheryl, and her friend Calvin Crigger. The only two witnesses at trial were appellant and Cheryl Harrod. Cheryl testified that on September 15, 1983, Calvin Crigger came over to visit when she thought appellant had gone to work; that 'all of a sudden [appellant] came out of the bedroom with a hammer in his hand, swinging it around, coming after me and my friend [Calvin]'; that Calvin ran out of the house and down the steps; that appellant 'had thrown the hammer over top of [Christopher's] port-a-crib in the living room, and it went into the wall'; that appellant then reentered the bedroom and returned with a five-inch blade hunting knife; that appellant told Cheryl that he was going to kill her and that, if she took his daughter away from him, he was going to kill Christopher; that appellant put the knife into the bannister near Cheryl's arm; that appellant followed Cheryl out to Calvin's car and 'went after Calvin, going around and around the car.'

Issue

Whether a person can be convicted of assaulting another who has suffered no harm and was never aware of the alleged assault.

We are called upon in this appeal to decide, inter alia, whether a person can be convicted of assaulting another who has suffered no harm and was never aware of the alleged assault.

Rule

The common law crime of assault encompasses two definitions: (1) an attempt to commit a battery or (2) an unlawful intentional act which places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.

The common law crime of assault encompasses two definitions: (1) an attempt to commit a battery or (2) an unlawful intentional act which places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.

Analysis

The court determined that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Harrod had the specific intent to injure his child when he threw the hammer. The court noted that the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply in cases where the intended victim is not harmed, and since the child was not aware of the actions, there was no basis for an assault conviction.

Nowhere does the record indicate that appellant threw the hammer with the specific intent to injure Christopher. The court expressly stated that it found specific intent on behalf of appellant because he '[t]hrew that hammer within a very short distance' of the child. The court here is merely inferring a criminal intent from reckless or negligent acts of the appellant. This is not sufficient, see LaFave & Scott, supra, at 610, especially where all of the evidence tends to the contrary: that appellant's intent was to injure Calvin.

Conclusion

The court reversed the conviction of assault upon the child and vacated the sentence related to that charge, while affirming the other judgments.

Because the trial court was clearly erroneous in finding appellant guilty of an assault on Christopher, we must reverse that conviction.

Who won?

John G. Harrod prevailed in part, as the court found insufficient evidence to support the assault conviction against his child.

Defendant John G. Harrod prevailed in part, as the court found insufficient evidence to support the assault conviction against his child.

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