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Keywords

liabilitystatutelease

contractliabilitystatuteleaseregulation

Related Cases

Hercules Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 938 F.2d 276, 33 ERC 1526, 291 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 60 USLW 2080, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,356

Facts

In 1986, Congress amended the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to impose notice requirements on federal agencies transferring contaminated real property. The EPA implemented these requirements but limited their application to properties where hazardous substance activities occurred during the period of government ownership. Petitioners challenged this limitation, arguing it was contrary to the statute's language and intent. The EPA also failed to define 'transfer' and did not address whether leases should be included in the notice requirements.

The EPA also declined to provide a definition of what constitutes a contract for the transfer of real property or to address the issue of whether leases should be deemed transfers of real property, stating with respect to leases that the question was better left for case-by-case determination by agencies.

Issue

Did the EPA's interpretation of the notice requirements under CERCLA, limiting them to properties where contamination occurred during government ownership, violate the statute's express terms?

Rule

Under CERCLA, federal agencies must provide notice of hazardous substances when transferring real property, regardless of when the contamination occurred, as mandated by section 120(h)(1).

A 1986 amendment to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq. (1988), imposes notice and covenant requirements on federal agencies that transfer real property contaminated by hazardous substances.

Analysis

The court found that the EPA's interpretation imposed an unwarranted limitation on the statute's language, which clearly required notice for all contaminated properties owned by the government. The court emphasized that the plain meaning of the statute extended notice obligations to properties contaminated by prior owners, and the EPA's failure to define 'transfer' or include leases did not justify its restrictive interpretation.

We reject the EPA's action because it reads into the statute a drastic limitation that nowhere appears in the words Congress chose and that, in fact, directly contradicts the unrestricted character of those words.

Conclusion

The court granted the petition for review, vacated the portion of the EPA's rule that limited notice obligations, and remanded the case for further rulemaking consistent with its opinion.

Accordingly, we grant the petition for review in that respect, vacate that portion of the rule, and remand to the EPA for further rulemaking consistent with this opinion.

Who won?

Petitioners prevailed because the court agreed that the EPA's interpretation of the statute was contrary to its express terms, thus requiring a revision of the rule.

Petitioners challenge each of these features of the EPA's rulemaking and claim further that the proposed regulation failed to provide adequate notice that the EPA might adopt these positions in its final rule.

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Keywords

Related Cases

Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2273, 105 L.Ed.2d 1, 29 ERC 1657, 57 USLW 4662, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,974

B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 43 ERC 1481, 65 USLW 2367, 36 Fed.R.Serv.3d 500, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,329, 45 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1303

Tippins Inc. v. USX Corp., 37 F.3d 87, 39 ERC 1321, 63 USLW 2172, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,486

Amigos Bravos v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management, 816 F.Supp.2d 1118, 181 Oil & Gas Rep. 1200

U.S. v. Mead Corp., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1986 WL 955, 1986-1 Trade Cases P 67,096