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Keywords

discoveryliabilitysummary judgmentstrict liability
discoveryliabilitysummary judgmentstrict liability

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Hill v. Searle Laboratories, a Div. of Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 884 F.2d 1064, 58 USLW 2172, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 12,250

Facts

In 1981, Connie Hill had a Searle-manufactured copper IUD, the CU–7, implanted. Three years later, after giving birth, she underwent tubal ligation surgery, during which it was discovered that the CU–7 had perforated her uterus and was embedded in her small bowel. Hill and her husband sued Searle, claiming defects in the product and inadequate warnings. After six months of discovery, Searle was granted summary judgment by the district court, which concluded that the CU–7 was a prescription drug and that the warnings provided to Hill's physician were adequate.

In 1981, a Searle-manufactured copper intrauterine device (IUD), a CU–7, was implanted in Connie Hill. Three years later, she gave birth to a child. The next day, she had tubal ligation surgery. During this surgery, it was discovered that the CU–7 had perforated Hill's uterus and was partially embedded in her small bowel. Hill and her husband then brought suit against Searle. After six months of discovery, Searle requested and was granted summary judgment.

Issue

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment to Searle on the grounds that the CU–7 was a prescription drug and that the learned intermediary rule applied, thereby absolving Searle of liability for inadequate warnings?

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment to Searle on the grounds that the CU–7 was a prescription drug and that the learned intermediary rule applied, thereby absolving Searle of liability for inadequate warnings?

Rule

Under Arkansas law, a supplier is liable for harm caused by a product if it is in a defective condition that renders it unreasonably dangerous, and this condition is a proximate cause of the injury. The learned intermediary rule allows manufacturers to fulfill their duty to warn by informing the prescribing physician, rather than the patient directly.

Under Arkansas law, a supplier is liable for harm caused by a product if it is in a defective condition that renders it unreasonably dangerous, and this condition is a proximate cause of the injury. The learned intermediary rule allows manufacturers to fulfill their duty to warn by informing the prescribing physician, rather than the patient directly.

Analysis

The court analyzed whether the CU–7 fell within the scope of the 'unavoidably unsafe' products exception to strict liability. It determined that while the Arkansas courts would likely adopt this exception, the CU–7 did not qualify because Searle failed to demonstrate an exceptional social need for the product. Furthermore, the court found that the learned intermediary rule was inapplicable in this case, as there was a genuine dispute regarding whether Hill received adequate warnings about the risks associated with the CU–7.

The court analyzed whether the CU–7 fell within the scope of the 'unavoidably unsafe' products exception to strict liability. It determined that while the Arkansas courts would likely adopt this exception, the CU–7 did not qualify because Searle failed to demonstrate an exceptional social need for the product. Furthermore, the court found that the learned intermediary rule was inapplicable in this case, as there was a genuine dispute regarding whether Hill received adequate warnings about the risks associated with the CU–7.

Conclusion

The appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case, concluding that Hill was entitled to be personally warned about the risks of the CU–7, and that there was a factual dispute regarding whether such a warning was provided.

The appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case, concluding that Hill was entitled to be personally warned about the risks of the CU–7, and that there was a factual dispute regarding whether such a warning was provided.

Who won?

Connie Hill and her husband prevailed in part because the court found that the learned intermediary rule did not apply and that there was a genuine dispute regarding whether Hill received adequate warnings about the CU–7.

Connie Hill and her husband prevailed in part because the court found that the learned intermediary rule did not apply and that there was a genuine dispute regarding whether Hill received adequate warnings about the CU–7.

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