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motionsummary judgment
injunctionappealsummary judgment

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Hiner v. Hoffman, 90 Hawai‘i 188, 977 P.2d 878

Facts

The Hoffmans own a lot in the Pacific Palisades neighborhood of Pearl City, which is subject to a restrictive covenant filed in 1966 that prohibits dwellings exceeding two stories in height. The Hoffmans built a three-story home after receiving city approval, which partially blocked the view of neighboring properties. Neighbors filed a complaint claiming the home violated the covenant, leading to a series of court motions and ultimately a summary judgment against the Hoffmans.

The Hoffmans own a lot in the Pacific Palisades neighborhood of Pearl City, in the City and County of Honolulu. Dukes and Hollman own a lot on the mauka side of the Hoffmans' lot. Hiner owns a lot adjacent to Dukes and Hollman's lot. The Pacific Palisades Community Association is the neighborhood homeowner's association.

Issue

Is the restrictive covenant prohibiting dwellings that exceed 'two stories in height' ambiguous and unenforceable?

The central issue on appeal is the interpretation of language in a 1966 restrictive covenant running with the Hoffmans' land.

Rule

The court determined that the ambiguity of a covenant is a question of law that can be resolved on summary judgment, and substantial doubts or ambiguities in restrictive covenants are resolved against the party seeking enforcement.

The preliminary question of whether a covenant is ambiguous is a question of law that may be resolved on summary judgment.

Analysis

The court found that the covenant's failure to define the height of a 'story' rendered it ambiguous. The language 'two stories in height' does not provide a measurable limit, making it impossible to determine if the Hoffmans' three-story home violated the covenant. The court emphasized that the purpose of the covenant was to limit height to protect view planes, but the language used was ineffective in achieving that goal.

We agree with the Hoffmans that, under the circumstances of this case, the language of the 1966 covenant is ambiguous on its face and, therefore, that the circuit court erroneously issued the mandatory injunction.

Conclusion

The court vacated the circuit court's order granting summary judgment against the Hoffmans and remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of the Hoffmans.

Because we hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the terms of the 1966 covenant are ambiguous and unenforceable against the Hoffmans, we further hold that the circuit court erred when it issued its mandatory injunction ordering the Hoffmans to remove the top story of their home.

Who won?

The Hoffmans prevailed in the case because the court found the restrictive covenant to be ambiguous and unenforceable.

The Hoffmans prevailed in the case because we agree that the failure to define the measurable height of a 'story' renders the restrictive covenant ambiguous.

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