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Keywords

attorneystatuteparole

attorneyparoleappellant

Related Cases

Holguin v. Raines, 695 F.2d 372

Facts

Andrew Holguin was serving three concurrent sentences for assault and an additional consecutive sentence for kidnapping. Initially, the Arizona Department of Corrections calculated his parole eligibility based on a method that allowed him to be eligible for parole in 1979. However, following a 1974 Arizona Supreme Court decision, the method for calculating parole eligibility changed, requiring Holguin to serve more time before being eligible for parole. After exhausting state remedies, Holguin filed a federal habeas petition claiming the changes violated the ex post facto clause.

On July 8, 1972, Holguin began serving three concurrent ten to twenty year sentences after conviction on three counts of assault with a deadly weapon. On February 28, 1973, Holguin received an additional sentence of nine to ten years for kidnapping to run consecutively with his earlier sentences for assault.

Issue

Did the Arizona Department of Corrections' change in calculating parole eligibility, which applied retroactively to Holguin's detriment, violate the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution?

The ex post facto provision of Article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution forbids the states from passing any law “which punishes as a crime an act previously committed which was innocent when done; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.”

Rule

The ex post facto clause prohibits laws that retroactively increase the punishment for a crime after it has been committed. This includes both legislative changes and administrative interpretations that alter the legal consequences of acts completed before the change.

The ex post facto clause limits the powers of legislatures but does not, of its own force, apply to the judicial branch.

Analysis

The court analyzed whether the change in the Arizona Attorney General's opinion regarding parole eligibility was merely a correction of an earlier erroneous interpretation or an extension of the law. It concluded that the change was a necessary adjustment following the Arizona Supreme Court's interpretation in Mileham, which clarified the application of the parole statute to consecutive sentences. Therefore, the court found that the ex post facto clause did not apply.

Yet appellant's argument ignores the impact of the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Mileham v. Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles, 110 Ariz. 470, 520 P.2d 840 (1974). If, as the district court concluded, the result in Mileham required that the Attorney General change what had been an incorrect opinion regarding parole for consecutive sentences, then the ex post facto issue here is controlled by this court's opinion in Mileham v. Simmons, 588 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir.1979).

Conclusion

The court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the changes in parole eligibility did not violate the ex post facto clause.

Affirmed.

Who won?

The Arizona Department of Corrections prevailed because the court found that the changes in parole eligibility were justified and did not constitute a violation of the ex post facto clause.

The court concluded that the changes in parole eligibility did not violate the ex post facto clause.

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