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Keywords

jurisdictionappealtrialmotion
jurisdictiontrialrespondent

Related Cases

In Matter of Ball, 168 N.H. 133, 123 A.3d 719

Facts

Frank A. Ball and Glenda J. Ball were married in 1994 and separated in 2004, having three children together. In July 2005, they entered into a separation agreement in Massachusetts that required Frank to pay child support until the children were emancipated, which under Massachusetts law could extend beyond age 18 if certain conditions were met. After relocating to New Hampshire in 2008, the parties modified their agreement to apply New Hampshire law, but when Frank sought to terminate support for their eldest child after she graduated high school, the trial court denied his motion, leading to this appeal.

The respondent and the petitioner, Glenda J. Ball, were married in 1994 and separated in 2004. They have three children: a daughter born in 1995, a son born in 1997, and another son born in 1999.

Issue

Did the trial court have jurisdiction to modify the child support obligation set forth in the Massachusetts support order, and did the ex-wife waive any error in the application of New Hampshire law regarding the definition of emancipation?

Did the trial court have subject matter jurisdiction in 2008 to change the duration of the respondent's child support obligation from that set forth in the Massachusetts support order?

Rule

The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) governs the jurisdiction of courts in modifying child support orders issued by another state, and a court may modify such an order if all parties reside in the new state and the child does not reside in the issuing state.

UIFSA applies when more than one state is involved in child support proceedings.

Analysis

The court determined that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to modify the child support order because all parties resided in New Hampshire and the child did not reside in Massachusetts. The court also found that the ex-wife waived any argument regarding the application of Massachusetts law by agreeing to the 2008 stipulation that allowed New Hampshire law to govern the support obligation.

The trial court in this case had subject matter jurisdiction under Section 613 of UIFSA, codified in New Hampshire as RSA 546–B:51, to rule upon the parties' request for modification.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case, requiring the trial court to terminate Frank A. Ball's child support obligation for their eldest child as per the 2008 order.

Thus, because applying New Hampshire law to the duration of the respondent's child support obligation is not a jurisdictional defect, the trial court's 2008 order is not void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Who won?

Frank A. Ball prevailed in the case because the Supreme Court found that the trial court had jurisdiction to modify the support order and that the ex-wife had waived her right to contest the application of New Hampshire law.

The Supreme Court, Conboy, J., held that: 1 trial court's alleged failure to comply with section of Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) governing modification of support orders entered by another state did not deprive trial court of jurisdiction to adjudicate ex-husband's request, and 2 ex-wife waived alleged error in application of New Hampshire law to determine definition of child's emancipation, for calculation of duration of ex-husband's support obligation.

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