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Keywords

appealtrialmotiondue process
trialmotionadoption

Related Cases

In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 124 A.L.R.5th 731

Facts

Clark and McLeod were in a committed relationship for eleven years and adopted E.L.M.C. from China. They filed a joint petition for custody in 1996, which was granted, establishing joint custody. After their relationship ended, Clark sought to limit McLeod's parenting time, leading to a legal dispute over parental responsibilities. The trial court found that McLeod had acted as a psychological parent to E.L.M.C. and awarded her joint parental responsibilities, except in areas of religion and dental care.

The trial court found, with record support, the following facts. Clark and McLeod lived in a committed relationship for eleven years before this action; they owned a home in joint tenancy, had a commitment ceremony, and discussed having a child through in vitro fertilization or by adoption.

Issue

Whether the trial court's award of joint parental responsibilities to McLeod, a nonparent, unconstitutionally interfered with Clark's rights as the legal parent, particularly regarding the child's religious upbringing.

Hence, we consider whether here, in light of Troxel, the trial court's award of joint parental responsibilities to McLeod, neither a natural nor an adoptive parent, under §§ 14–10–123, 14–10–123.4, and 14–10–124(1.5), C.R.S.2003, unconstitutionally interferes with Clark's fundamental right as the fit, legal parent to make decisions regarding E.L.M.C.

Rule

The court applied the psychological parent doctrine and determined that a compelling state interest in preventing emotional harm to the child justified interference with the adoptive mother's due process rights.

A legislative enactment that infringes on a fundamental right is constitutionally permissible only if it is necessary to promote a compelling state interest and does so in the least restrictive manner possible. In re Custody of C.M., 74 P.3d 342, 344 (Colo.App.2002) (citing Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo.1994), aff'd, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996)).

Analysis

The court found that McLeod had established a psychological parent relationship with E.L.M.C. and that the trial court's decision to award joint parental responsibilities was supported by evidence of the child's emotional well-being. The court also noted that the limitation on religious teachings needed further findings to ensure it did not infringe on Clark's constitutional rights.

We conclude that, although Troxel did not specify the standard of review, statutory interference with the constitutional rights of a fit, legal parent should be subjected to strict scrutiny.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision to award joint parental responsibilities to McLeod but vacated the limitation on religious teachings, remanding for further findings.

We affirm the trial court's parental responsibilities allocation on the basis that McLeod had become E.L.M.C.'s psychological parent, E.L.M.C.'s continuous recognition of McLeod as a parent almost from birth, E.L.M.C.'s age—nine years when the trial court entered permanent orders—and the risk of emotional harm to her inherent in Clark's parenting plan, which curtailed and then terminated McLeod's court-ordered parenting time.

Who won?

Elsey Maxwell McLeod prevailed in part because the court recognized her as a psychological parent and found that her involvement was in the child's best interests.

We uphold the trial court's allocation of equal parental responsibilities to McLeod, but on narrower grounds.

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