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Keywords

appealprobatewill

appealmotionsummary judgmentwillappellantmotion for summary judgment

Related Cases

In re Estate of Burleson, 738 A.2d 1199

Facts

William A. Burleson executed multiple wills during his life, with the last two being a 1993 will that named his companion's daughter, Pamela Marie Stansel Merritt, and her sons as beneficiaries, and a 1994 will that revoked all prior wills and bequeathed his estate to the Smithsonian. After Burleson's death in a car accident, Merritt filed to probate the 1993 will, but the Smithsonian contested it, asserting that the 1994 will had been properly executed and revoked the earlier will. The original 1994 will was never found after it was sent back to Burleson, leading to disputes over its validity and the intentions behind its execution.

William A. Burleson died in a car accident on November 19, 1995, leaving an estate valued at over $2 million, including various real estate properties. Over the course of his life, Burleson executed four different wills; however, the wills that form the basis of this appeal are the latter two, one executed in 1993, naming appellant and her sons as sole beneficiaries in equal shares, and a subsequent 1994 will in which Burleson revoked all prior wills and left his entire estate to the Smithsonian.

Issue

Did the 1994 will effectively revoke the 1993 will, and did the Smithsonian have standing to contest the probate of the 1993 will?

Appellant's main contention on appeal is that the 1994 will never became effective, and consequently could not have revoked the 1993 will, because the later will was destroyed by the testator prior to his death with the intention of revoking it.

Rule

A will may be revoked by a subsequent will that is properly executed, and a prior will cannot be revived unless it is re-executed or a codicil is executed in accordance with statutory provisions.

Thus, we now hold that under D.C.Code § 18–109, a prior will may be revoked upon the execution of a subsequent will, and may not be revived unless the prior will has been re-executed or a codicil executed in accordance with other statutory provisions.

Analysis

The court found that the 1994 will was validly executed and contained a clear revocation clause. Even if the original 1994 will was destroyed, the execution of the will itself was sufficient to revoke the 1993 will. The court also determined that the Smithsonian had standing as a legatee in being, as it would lose property under the 1994 will if the 1993 will were admitted to probate.

Noting these facts, appellant relies on the rebuttable presumption in Webb v. Lohnes, 69 App.D.C. 318, 101 F.2d 242 (1938) that if a will, known to be in existence during the testator's lifetime, and in his custody, cannot be found at the testator's death, the testator must have destroyed the will with the intention of revoking it.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that the 1994 will effectively revoked the 1993 will and that the Smithsonian had standing to contest the probate.

Therefore, even if we were to assume, from the fact that the original 1994 will was not found at the time of his death, that Burleson intended to revoke his 1994 will, an issue which we need not decide, this would not change the fact that the 1993 will was rendered void upon execution of the 1994 will containing a revocation clause.

Who won?

The Smithsonian Institution prevailed in the case because the court found that the 1994 will was validly executed and revoked the prior 1993 will.

The court granted the United States' motion for summary judgment against appellant on the ground that the 1993 will had been revoked by the proper execution of the 1994 will.

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