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Keywords

statuteprecedenttrialsummary judgmentwillcondition precedent

statutemotionsummary judgmentwillmotion for summary judgment

Related Cases

In re Estate of Rehwinkel, 71 Wash.App. 827, 862 P.2d 639

Facts

Leo Rehwinkel executed his last will and testament in 1968, directing that his estate be distributed only to those relatives who were living at the time of his death. His niece, Helene Anderson, was a named beneficiary but died a month before Rehwinkel. Ronald Fossum, Helene's son, filed a petition claiming he was entitled to his mother's share under the anti-lapse statute, arguing that the will did not clearly show an intent to preclude the statute's application. The estate moved for summary judgment, asserting that the will's language indicated a clear intent to limit bequests to living relatives.

In 1968 Leo Rehwinkel executed his last will and testament. The first section of the will directs that all of Leo's expenses and legal obligations be paid from his estate. The next provision states: II. I give, devise and bequeath the entire residue of my estate, both real and personal property and wherever situated, to those of the following who are living at the time of my death, share and share alike.

Issue

Did the language of Leo Rehwinkel's will manifest a clear intent to preclude the application of the anti-lapse statute?

We are presented with a single issue regarding application of the anti-lapse statute, RCW 11.12.110, which provides in pertinent part: Death of devisee or legatee before testator.

Rule

The anti-lapse statute, RCW 11.12.110, allows lineal descendants of a deceased beneficiary to inherit their share unless the testator clearly indicates otherwise in the will.

The anti-lapse statute reflects a legislative determination that, as a matter of public policy, when a testator fails to provide for the possibility that his consanguineous beneficiary will predecease him, the lineal descendants of the beneficiary take his or her share.

Analysis

The court analyzed the language of the will, particularly the phrase 'to those of the following who are living at the time of my death,' which indicated that only living beneficiaries could inherit. The court found that this language demonstrated a clear intent to preclude the anti-lapse statute's application, as it established a condition precedent for taking under the will. The court also noted that the presumption in favor of the anti-lapse statute does not apply when the testator provides for an alternative disposition.

We agree with the Estate that the language 'to those of the following who are living at the time of my death' manifests a clear intent to preclude application of the statute.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the estate, concluding that Fossum's claim to inherit under the anti-lapse statute was denied because his mother predeceased the testator.

We hold that the language of distribution to those 'who are living at the time of my death' manifests the testator's clear intent that the anti-lapse statute not apply.

Who won?

The estate of Leo August Rehwinkel prevailed because the court found that the will's language clearly indicated the testator's intent to limit bequests to those who were living at the time of his death.

The Estate filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Fossum should not be declared an heir of Leo Rehwinkel.

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