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Keywords

attorneyappealmotionmotion to dismiss
attorneyappealmotionmotion to dismiss

Related Cases

In re Lindsey A.F., 262 Wis.2d 200, 2003 WI 63, 663 N.W.2d 757

Facts

Lindsey A.F., a 13-year-old, sold marijuana while in middle school. After an intake worker referred her case to the district attorney, a delinquency petition was filed, but the district attorney did not pursue a consent decree. Lindsey filed a motion to dismiss the petition, which the Circuit Court granted, leading to a deferred prosecution agreement. The State later attempted to terminate this agreement by filing a second petition with the same charges, which the court dismissed.

Lindsey A.F., age 13, sold marijuana while in a middle school. Her case was referred to an intake worker, who subsequently referred the case to the district attorney with a recommendation that the district attorney file a delinquency petition and enter into a consent decree.

Issue

Did the Circuit Court have the authority to dismiss the delinquency petitions and refer the matter for deferred prosecution when the juvenile was not in custody, and could the district attorney terminate the deferred prosecution agreement by filing a second petition?

We determine that under Wis. Stat. § 938.21(7) (1999–2000), a circuit court has authority to dismiss a juvenile delinquency petition and refer the matter for deferred prosecution regardless of whether the juvenile is in custody.

Rule

Under Wis. Stat. § 938.21(7), a circuit court has the authority to dismiss a juvenile delinquency petition and refer the matter for deferred prosecution regardless of whether the juvenile is in custody.

Wisconsin Stat. § 938.21(7) provides: (7) Deferred prosecution. If the judge or juvenile court commissioner determines that the best interests of the juvenile and the public are served, he or she may enter a consent decree under s. 938.32 or order the petition dismissed and refer the matter to the intake worker for deferred prosecution in accordance with s. 938.245.

Analysis

The court examined the statutory language and legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 938.21(7) and concluded that the authority to dismiss and refer for deferred prosecution is not limited to cases where the juvenile is in custody. The court also determined that the district attorney does not have the authority to terminate a court-ordered deferred prosecution agreement by filing a second petition with the same charges, as this would undermine the court's authority.

We conclude, however, that the legislature did not intend such a limitation, which is a position that the State did not dispute in its court of appeals brief.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the Circuit Court had the authority to dismiss the delinquency petitions and that the district attorney could not terminate the deferred prosecution agreement by filing a second petition.

Therefore, based on our examination of the statutory language, the legislative history, context, and purpose, we determine that the legislature did not intend the interpretation advanced by the State.

Who won?

Lindsey A.F. prevailed in the case because the court upheld the Circuit Court's authority to dismiss the petitions and refer the matter for deferred prosecution, rejecting the State's arguments.

Lindsey again filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the second petition was the same as the first petition and that no new information existed to justify the re-filing of an already dismissed petition.

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