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Keywords

probatewill

probatetrustwillappellant

Related Cases

In re Mansur’s Will, 98 Vt. 296, 127 A. 297

Facts

Zophar M. Mansur died on March 28, 1914, leaving a will that bequeathed $30,000 to his granddaughter, Sallie L. Storrs, with provisions for payment at certain ages. Sallie married Clifford H. Tate and died intestate on November 23, 1921, leaving behind a daughter. Tate, as the administrator of Sallie's estate, petitioned for the distribution of the Mansur estate, which was dismissed by the probate court on the grounds that the legacy had lapsed.

The agreed facts in the case, so far as material to the question before us, are these: Zophar M. Mansur died March 28, 1914. He was survived by one son, Arthur G., and two grandchildren, John D. Storrs and Sallie L. Storrs, children of a daughter who died December 1, 1911. Mr. Mansur left a will bearing date January 15, 1914, which was allowed by the probate court in said district April 21, 1914, which contained the following provision: 'I give to my granddaughter, Sallie L. Storrs, the sum of thirty thousand dollars, to be placed in the hands of a trustee, the income thereof to be paid to the said Sallie L. Storrs semiannually, one-half of the principal to be paid to the said Sallie L. Storrs when she shall become thirty years of age and the remaining one-half when she shall become thirty-five years of age.'

Issue

Did the probate court err in dismissing the petition based on the determination that the legacy to Sallie L. Storrs did not vest?

Whether the court erred in dismissing the petition depends, entirely, upon whether the provision in the Mansur will, above quoted, created a vested or a contingent legacy, and this, in turn, depends upon whether the contingency, namely, the attainment of a certain age by the legatee, attached to the substance of the gift or to the time of payment thereof.

Rule

The law favors the vesting of estates upon the death of the testator, and a legacy is considered vested if the contingency is related only to the time of payment rather than the substance of the gift.

In construing wills, the first and chief object is to ascertain the intention of the testator since, so far as it may be legally carried out, that governs.

Analysis

The court analyzed the language of the will and applied established rules of construction regarding legacies. It concluded that the provision for payment at certain ages was related to the time of payment, not the substance of the gift, thus indicating the testator's intent for the legacy to vest immediately upon his death.

Applying the rules of construction already referred to, in the light of the application given them in the cases cited, to the case at bar, it would seem that but one conclusion could be reached.

Conclusion

The appellate court reversed the probate court's decree and remanded the case for further proceedings, affirming that the legacy of $30,000 vested in Sallie Storrs Tate immediately upon the death of the testator.

We hold, therefore, that the legacy of $30,000 vested in Sallie Storrs Tate immediately upon the death of the testator and, consequently, that the appellant, as her legal representative, is entitled to receive the same out of the testator's estate.

Who won?

Clifford H. Tate prevailed in the case as the court determined that the legacy vested in his deceased wife, allowing him to claim the assets from the Mansur estate.

The appellant insists that since the legatee had the entire beneficial interest in the legacy, he is entitled to recover the full amount of the principal at once, and calls attention to numerous authorities that seem to support this view.

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