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Keywords

litigationlawyerwillnonprofit

litigationlawyerappealnonprofitappellantappellee

Related Cases

In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 1893, 56 L.Ed.2d 417

Facts

Edna Smith Primus, a practicing lawyer in South Carolina and cooperating lawyer with the ACLU, advised a group of women about their legal rights regarding sterilization under public medical assistance. After the ACLU offered to represent these women, Primus sent a letter to one of them, Mary Etta Williams, informing her of the free legal assistance available. The South Carolina Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline charged Primus with solicitation in violation of Disciplinary Rules, leading to a private reprimand that was later increased to a public reprimand by the Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Appellant, Edna Smith Primus, is a lawyer practicing in Columbia, S. C. During the period in question, she was associated with the 'Carolina Community Law Firm,' and was an officer of and cooperating lawyer with the Columbia branch of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). She received no compensation for her work on behalf of the ACLU, but was paid a retainer as a legal consultant for the South Carolina Council on Human Relations (Council), a nonprofit organization with offices in Columbia.

Issue

Whether the disciplinary action taken against Edna Smith Primus for soliciting a prospective litigant on behalf of the ACLU violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

We consider on this appeal whether a State may punish a member of its Bar who, seeking to further political and ideological goals through associational activity, including litigation, advises a lay person of her legal rights and discloses in a subsequent letter that free legal assistance is available from a nonprofit organization with which the lawyer and her associates are affiliated.

Rule

Solicitation of prospective litigants by nonprofit organizations that engage in litigation as a form of political expression and association is entitled to First Amendment protection, and government may regulate such conduct only with narrow specificity.

Solicitation of prospective litigants by nonprofit organizations that engage in litigation as 'a form of political expression' and 'political association' constitutes expressive and associational conduct entitled to First Amendment protection, as to which government may regulate only 'with narrow specificity.'

Analysis

The court applied the rule by examining the nature of Primus's solicitation, determining that it was not for pecuniary gain but rather to further political and civil liberties objectives. The court noted that the disciplinary rules were overly broad and could suppress associational freedoms, thus failing to meet the required precision in regulating First Amendment rights. The court found no evidence of misconduct that warranted the disciplinary action taken against Primus.

The record does not support appellee's contention that undue influence, overreaching, misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, conflict of interest, or lay interference actually occurred in this case. And the State's interests in preventing the 'stirring up' of frivolous or vexatious litigation and minimizing commercialization of the legal profession offer no further justification for the discipline administered to appellant.

Conclusion

The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the disciplinary action against Edna Smith Primus, concluding that her solicitation was protected by the First Amendment and did not constitute unethical conduct.

Held: South Carolina's application of its Disciplinary Rules to appellant's solicitation by letter on the ACLU's behalf violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Who won?

Edna Smith Primus prevailed in the case because the court found that her actions were protected by the First Amendment and did not warrant disciplinary action.

The court found that her actions did not warrant disciplinary action under the First Amendment.

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