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Keywords

attorneyappealtrialhabeas corpusprosecutorrespondent
attorneyappealhearingtrialprosecutorrespondent

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Jackson v. Commissioner of Correction, 227 Conn. 124, 629 A.2d 413

Facts

Dennis Jackson was convicted of first degree sexual assault, second degree kidnapping, and first degree robbery in 1982. His attorney, John Buckley, had an agreement with prosecutor Patrick Clifford to use evidence from a previous case to challenge the jury array. However, when the case was taken over by prosecutor Robert Devlin, he refused to stipulate to the use of that evidence. Buckley requested a continuance to gather necessary evidence, but the trial court denied this request, preventing Jackson from challenging the jury array at trial. Jackson did not raise the denial of the continuance in his direct appeal.

The petitioner was represented at his criminal trial by Attorney John Buckley, who testified at the habeas hearing. Sometime prior to the petitioner's trial, Attorney Buckley reached an agreement with then Assistant State's Attorney Patrick Clifford, who was then the prosecutor regarding petitioner's case.

Issue

Did the habeas court properly apply the cause and prejudice standard to determine whether the petitioner had good cause for failing to pursue his jury array claim on direct appeal?

Did the habeas court properly conclude that there was insufficient cause for [the] petitioner's failure to pursue on direct appeal his claim that the composition of the jury array violated his constitutional rights?

Rule

The cause and prejudice standard is used to analyze procedural defaults in habeas corpus claims that were not properly pursued on direct appeal, requiring a showing of both cause for the default and actual prejudice resulting from it.

We now conclude that the Wainwright cause and prejudice standard should be employed to determine the reviewability of habeas claims that were not properly pursued on direct appeal.

Analysis

The court applied the cause and prejudice standard to Jackson's case, determining that the denial of his attorney's request for a continuance did not constitute sufficient cause for failing to raise the jury array claim on direct appeal. The court noted that Jackson had the opportunity to challenge the denial of the continuance on appeal but did not do so, which undermined his claim of cause for the procedural default.

The petitioner, however, did not challenge this denial on appeal.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the habeas court's judgment, concluding that Jackson failed to demonstrate good cause for not pursuing his jury array claim on direct appeal.

The judgment is affirmed.

Who won?

The respondent, Commissioner of Correction, prevailed because the court found that the petitioner did not meet the cause and prejudice standard necessary to review his habeas claim.

The respondent, the commissioner of correction, asserted that, in each case, the habeas court had properly concluded that the composition of the jury array did not violate the petitioner's constitutional rights.

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