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Keywords

lawsuitdefendantappealtrialdomestic violencedue process
defendantattorneytrialdomestic violencedue process

Related Cases

Jacobsen v. King, 2012 IL App (2d) 110721, 971 N.E.2d 620, 361 Ill.Dec. 518

Facts

In June 2008, the Illinois General Assembly enacted Public Act 95–711, increasing the marriage license fee by $5 to fund the Married Families Domestic Violence Fund. Jillian Jacobsen paid this fee when she applied for a marriage license in June 2009. In November 2010, she filed a lawsuit against the Du Page County clerk and other officials, claiming the fee violated the Illinois Constitution's guarantees of due process, equal protection, and tax uniformity. The trial court dismissed her complaint, leading to her appeal.

In June 2008, in Public Act 95–711, the Illinois General Assembly increased by $5 the fee for obtaining a marriage license. The $5 charge funds the Married Families Domestic Violence Fund (the Fund). See 55 ILCS 5/4–12003, 4–4001 (West 2010). The General Assembly created the Fund in order to award grants to public and private agencies that facilitate or provide free legal services to currently or formerly married domestic violence victims seeking remedies for domestic violence through civil proceedings (such as dissolution of marriage). It is administered by the Attorney General of Illinois.

Issue

Did the $5 fee added to the cost of a marriage license violate the Illinois Constitution's uniformity clause, equal protection, or due process rights?

Did the $5 fee added to the cost of a marriage license violate the Illinois Constitution's uniformity clause, equal protection, or due process rights?

Rule

The uniformity clause requires that tax classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference between those taxed and those not taxed, and must bear a reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation.

Under the uniformity clause, tax classifications must (1) be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed, and (2) bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy.

Analysis

The court determined that the $5 fee was constitutional as it was imposed only on those obtaining marriage licenses and was used to fund programs for domestic violence victims. The court found a reasonable relationship between the fee and the legislative purpose, noting that some individuals who marry may need legal services to escape abusive relationships. The court also distinguished this case from a previous ruling that struck down a similar fee, emphasizing that the current fee was specifically targeted at helping married individuals.

The court determined that the $5 fee was constitutional as it was imposed only on those obtaining marriage licenses and was used to fund programs for domestic violence victims. The court found a reasonable relationship between the fee and the legislative purpose, noting that some individuals who marry may need legal services to escape abusive relationships. The court also distinguished this case from a previous ruling that struck down a similar fee, emphasizing that the current fee was specifically targeted at helping married individuals.

Conclusion

The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Jacobsen's complaint, concluding that the $5 fee did not violate the uniformity clause, equal protection, or due process rights.

The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Jacobsen's complaint, concluding that the $5 fee did not violate the uniformity clause, equal protection, or due process rights.

Who won?

The defendants, including the Du Page County clerk, prevailed because the court found the fee to be constitutional and reasonably related to its intended purpose of aiding domestic violence victims.

The defendants argued that the fee was constitutional because it was imposed only on those who were getting married and was used to fund programs supporting married or formerly married victims of domestic violence.

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