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Keywords

divorce

trialdivorcealimonyappellantappellee

Related Cases

Jizmejian v. Jizmejian, 16 Ariz.App. 270, 492 P.2d 1208

Facts

The parties were married in Illinois in 1947 and moved to Arizona in 1964 due to the husband's military service. The wife testified that the couple had not engaged in sexual relations since 1957, and the situation deteriorated to the point where she secured a decree of separation in 1967. The husband contended that the wife had refused sexual relations, but the court found that his withdrawal constituted cruel and inhuman treatment, warranting a divorce.

Appellee testified that the last time the parties had sexual relations was in the year 1957, and that since that time she attempted to have sexual relations with him but he refused. Furthermore, she testified that not only did he refuse to have sexual relations but that he had not even kissed her since the year 1957.

Issue

The main legal issues were whether the court erred in granting a divorce based on cruel and inhuman treatment and whether the property awarded to the wife was properly classified as community property under Illinois law.

Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in granting a divorce to the appellee since she proved no grounds and further contends that the court erred in granting her alimony in the sum of $300 per month, in finding that certain property was community property, and in awarding appellee $6,000 as her share of said property.

Rule

The court applied the principle that total unjustified withdrawal from sexual intercourse over a significant period can constitute cruel and inhuman treatment, and that property interests acquired during marriage are determined by the law of the matrimonial domicile at the time of acquisition.

The rule is that property interests in movables acquired by the spouses during a marriage are determined by the law of the matrimonial domicile at the time of acquisition.

Analysis

The court found that the husband's total withdrawal from sexual relations for over ten years constituted cruel and inhuman treatment, justifying the divorce. However, it also determined that the wife failed to establish a change of domicile from Illinois to Arizona, which meant that the property in question, including insurance policies and checking accounts, remained the husband's separate property under Illinois law.

Although the court improperly entered a ‘Brown Decree’ the appellee is not complaining of the form of the decree and the court very properly dissolved the marriage.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the divorce but reversed the award of property to the wife, directing that the insurance policies and checking accounts be classified as the husband's separate property.

The decree is affirmed in all other respects.

Who won?

The prevailing party was the husband, as he successfully challenged the award of property to the wife, demonstrating that under Illinois law, she had no claim to the insurance policies or checking accounts.

The court found that certain property was the community property of the parties.

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