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Keywords

litigationattorneylawyerstatuteinjunctionappealcivil rights
attorneylawyerstatuteappealcivil rights

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Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 111 S.Ct. 1435, 113 L.Ed.2d 486, 55 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 737, 59 USLW 4279

Facts

Kay, an attorney licensed in Florida, sought to have his name placed on the Democratic Party's primary ballot for President of the United States. The Kentucky Board of Elections denied his request, stating he did not meet the criteria of being 'generally advocated and nationally recognized.' Kay filed a civil rights action challenging the constitutionality of the statute, which he won, leading to an injunction requiring his name to appear on the ballot. However, when he sought attorney's fees after his victory, the District Court denied the request, a decision that was upheld by the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner is licensed to practice law in Florida. In 1980, he requested the Kentucky Board of Elections (Board) to place his name on the Democratic Party's primary ballot for the office of President of the United States.

Issue

Whether a pro se attorney who successfully litigates a civil rights action is entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

The question then is whether a lawyer who represents himself should be treated like other pro se litigants or like a client who has had the benefit of the advice and advocacy of an independent attorney.

Rule

A pro se litigant who is also a lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees under § 1988, as the statute's purpose is to ensure that victims of civil rights violations obtain independent counsel.

Held: A pro se litigant who is also a lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees under § 1988.

Analysis

The court analyzed the text and legislative history of § 1988, concluding that it was designed to encourage the hiring of independent counsel for civil rights cases. The court noted that even skilled lawyers representing themselves face disadvantages in litigation, such as ethical conflicts and lack of an objective perspective. Therefore, allowing attorney's fees for pro se attorneys would undermine the statute's goal of promoting the effective prosecution of meritorious claims through independent legal representation.

In the end, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the overriding statutory concern is the interest in obtaining independent counsel for victims of civil rights violations.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, ruling that a pro se attorney is not entitled to attorney's fees under § 1988.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Who won?

The Kentucky Board of Elections prevailed in the case because the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' decisions denying Kay's request for attorney's fees.

The majority read the language of the statute as assuming the existence of 'a paying relationship between an attorney and a client.'

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