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Keywords

extraditionimmigration lawadmissibility
extraditionimmigration lawadmissibility

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Kelava v. Gonzales

Facts

Kelava, an anti-communist dissident, came to the United States from Croatia as a refugee in 1969 and became a legal permanent resident in 1972. In 1978, he and another man took hostages at the West German Consulate in Chicago to prevent the extradition of a fellow dissident. After being convicted of unarmed imprisonment in 1980, nearly 20 years later, removal proceedings were initiated against him based on his past actions, which were classified as terrorist activity under U.S. immigration law.

Kelava, an anti-communist dissident, came to the United States from Croatia as a refugee in 1969 and became a legal permanent resident in 1972. In 1978, he and another man took hostages at the West German Consulate in Chicago to prevent the extradition of a fellow dissident. After being convicted of unarmed imprisonment in 1980, nearly 20 years later, removal proceedings were initiated against him based on his past actions, which were classified as terrorist activity under U.S. immigration law.

Issue

Whether the retroactive application of the law that eliminated the possibility of a discretionary waiver of inadmissibility for those who engaged in terrorist activity violated the petitioner's rights.

Whether the retroactive application of the law that eliminated the possibility of a discretionary waiver of inadmissibility for those who engaged in terrorist activity violated the petitioner's rights.

Rule

The court applied the principle that the government need only establish that an alien 'engaged in' terrorist activity after admission to the United States, without the necessity of a conviction for that activity.

The court applied the principle that the government need only establish that an alien 'engaged in' terrorist activity after admission to the United States, without the necessity of a conviction for that activity.

Analysis

The court determined that Kelava's argument regarding the retroactive application of the law was unfounded. It noted that the law did not require a conviction for the terrorist act, only that he had engaged in such activity. The court found it unreasonable for Kelava to claim that he would have acted differently had he known about the potential loss of eligibility for relief under 212(c).

The court determined that Kelava's argument regarding the retroactive application of the law was unfounded. It noted that the law did not require a conviction for the terrorist act, only that he had engaged in such activity. The court found it unreasonable for Kelava to claim that he would have acted differently had he known about the potential loss of eligibility for relief under 212(c).

Conclusion

The court upheld the BIA's decision, denying Kelava's petition for review and affirming that he was ineligible for a discretionary waiver of inadmissibility.

The court upheld the BIA's decision, denying Kelava's petition for review and affirming that he was ineligible for a discretionary waiver of inadmissibility.

Who won?

The government prevailed in the case, as the court upheld the BIA's decision that Kelava was ineligible for relief based on his engagement in terrorist activity.

The government prevailed in the case, as the court upheld the BIA's decision that Kelava was ineligible for relief based on his engagement in terrorist activity.

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