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Kernkamp v. Bolthouse, 714 So.2d 655, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D1803

Facts

In December 1990, Charlotte Luly executed her last will, leaving her estate to her son, John Kernkamp, and naming her niece, Lydia Bolthouse, as a contingent beneficiary. In March 1994, Luly executed a codicil that directed her personal representative to pay all debts and expenses from her Smith Barney account, with any remaining balance to go to Lydia. After Luly's death in 1995, a dispute arose over whether Lydia was entitled to the entire Smith Barney account or just the balance of the money market account after expenses were paid. The trial court ruled in favor of Lydia, stating the codicil was clear, but John appealed, claiming ambiguity in the codicil's language.

In December 1990, John's mother, Mrs. Charlotte Luly, executed her last will and testament. Mrs. Luly disposed of her jewelry by separate list and left the remainder of her estate to John. Mrs. Luly named several contingent successor beneficiaries, the last of whom was her niece, Lydia Barbara Bolthouse.

Issue

Was the codicil to Mrs. Luly's will ambiguous regarding the distribution of assets from the Smith Barney account?

We conclude that the reference to the Smith Barney account in the testatrix's codicil is ambiguous.

Rule

Where the terms of an instrument are clear and unambiguous, there is no need for the court to engage in a construction of the instrument. However, where there is ambiguity or uncertainty arising from the language used, construction of the instrument is necessary.

Where the terms of an instrument are clear and unambiguous, there is no need for the court to engage in a construction of the instrument.

Analysis

The court determined that the reference to the Smith Barney account in the codicil was ambiguous, as it did not specify which assets were included. The trial court's reliance on the Preferred Client FMA Statement was questioned, as it could support multiple interpretations regarding the assets in the account. The ambiguity necessitated a remand for consideration of extrinsic evidence to ascertain Mrs. Luly's intent regarding the distribution of her estate.

Since there is more than one reasonable interpretation of the reference to the Smith Barney account in the codicil, the cause is remanded for consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine Mrs. Luly's intent.

Conclusion

The District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine the testator's intent regarding the ambiguous language in the codicil.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

Who won?

The prevailing party was John Kernkamp, the personal representative, as the appellate court found the codicil ambiguous and remanded for further proceedings to clarify the testator's intent.

John Kernkamp, the personal representative of his mother's estate, appeals from an order requiring him to distribute estate assets to his mother's niece, pursuant to a codicil to his mother's will.

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