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Keywords

lawsuitdefendantlitigationattorneytrialmotiondeclaratory judgment
lawsuitplaintiffdefendantlitigationattorneystatutetrialmotionregulationdeclaratory judgment

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Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 279 Conn. 447, 904 A.2d 137

Facts

In August 2004, seven same-sex couples requested marriage licenses from the town clerk's office, but their requests were denied based on an attorney general's opinion stating that the law prohibited issuing licenses to same-sex couples. The couples filed a declaratory judgment action against the Department of Public Health, claiming that the marriage laws violated the Connecticut constitution. Shortly after, the Family Institute of Connecticut moved to intervene in the case, arguing that it had a vested interest in defending traditional marriage.

In August, 2004, the seven plaintiff couples went separately to the office of the defendant Dorothy Bean, the deputy and acting town clerk and registrar for vital statistics of the town of Madison, and requested applications for marriage licenses. An employee acting on Bean's behalf stated that, in accordance with an opinion authored by the attorney general dated May 17, 2004, she could not issue them marriage licenses. Thereafter, the plaintiffs commenced this action, claiming that, to the extent that any statute, regulation or common-law rule precludes otherwise qualified individuals from marrying because they wish to marry someone of the same sex, or are gay or lesbian couples, such statutes, regulations and common-law rules violated numerous provisions of the Connecticut constitution.

Issue

Did the trial court properly deny the Family Institute of Connecticut's motion to intervene in the declaratory judgment action brought by the same-sex couples?

Did the trial court properly deny the motion of the proposed intervenor, the Family Institute of Connecticut (institute), to intervene as a party defendant in this declaratory judgment action?

Rule

A proposed intervenor must demonstrate a direct and substantial interest in the subject matter of the litigation, and that their interest is not adequately represented by existing parties. The trial court's decision on intervention is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

The four element, conjunctive inquiry governing the decision on a motion for intervention as a matter of right is aptly summarized in Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, 60 Conn.App. at 134, 758 A.2d 916. Specifically, '[t]he motion to intervene must be timely, the movant must have a direct and substantial interest in the subject matter of the litigation, the movant's interest must be impaired by disposition of the litigation without the movant's involvement and the movant's interest must not be represented adequately by any party to the litigation.'

Analysis

The court found that the Family Institute's interest in the case was generalized and did not meet the threshold for intervention as a matter of right. The trial court concluded that the institute's interests were not distinct from those of the general public and that the attorney general adequately represented the state's interests in defending the marriage laws. The court also noted that allowing the institute to intervene could lead to an unwieldy lawsuit with numerous intervenors.

The court found that the Family Institute's interest in the case was generalized and did not meet the threshold for intervention as a matter of right. The trial court concluded that the institute's interests were not distinct from those of the general public and that the attorney general adequately represented the state's interests in defending the marriage laws. The court also noted that allowing the institute to intervene could lead to an unwieldy lawsuit with numerous intervenors.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the Family Institute of Connecticut did not have a sufficient interest to intervene and that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the motion for permissive intervention.

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the Family Institute of Connecticut did not have a sufficient interest to intervene and that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the motion for permissive intervention.

Who won?

The prevailing party was the defendants, as the court upheld the trial court's denial of the Family Institute's motion to intervene, finding that the institute lacked a sufficient legal interest.

The prevailing party was the defendants, as the court upheld the trial court's denial of the Family Institute's motion to intervene, finding that the institute lacked a sufficient legal interest.

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