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Keywords

attorneystatutetrialmotionsummary judgmentmalpracticelegal malpractice
contracttortplaintiffdefendantattorneystatutemalpracticelegal malpractice

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Koczor v. Melnyk, 407 Ill.App.3d 994, 944 N.E.2d 345, 348 Ill.Dec. 392

Facts

In October 1997, the Koczors hired Melnyk to assist with the purchase of two parcels of property. Melnyk assured them he would record the deeds, but by November 2007, the Koczors discovered that one parcel had not been recorded. Despite multiple attempts to contact Melnyk, he failed to provide the necessary assistance, leading the Koczors to hire a new attorney in January 2008. Melnyk later admitted to the new attorney that he had failed to record the deed.

In February 2009, plaintiffs Becky Koczor and Daniel Koczor filed a complaint for legal malpractice against defendant Gregory P. Melnyk for alleged malpractice arising out of a real estate transaction from November 1997.

Issue

Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment based on the statute of repose and in denying the Koczors' motion to reconsider?

The Appellate Court, McBride, J., held that legal malpractice claim accrued on last day that attorney could have recorded deed under tax deed statute, and attorney was not equitably estopped from asserting statute of repose defense.

Rule

The statute of repose for legal malpractice claims in Illinois is six years from the date of the act or omission, regardless of when the injury is discovered. Equitable estoppel may apply if a party can demonstrate reliance on a misrepresentation.

Section 13–214.3 provides that an action in tort or contract against an attorney arising out of an act or omission in the performance of professional services may not be commenced in any event more than six years after the date on which the act or omission occurred.

Analysis

The court found that the Koczors' claim was barred by the statute of repose, which expired six years after the last act of representation by Melnyk. The Koczors argued that equitable estoppel should toll the statute, but the court determined that they failed to show any misrepresentation by Melnyk that they relied upon to delay filing their claim. The court noted that Melnyk's initial assurance in 1997 could not serve as the basis for equitable estoppel since it was the same act that constituted the malpractice.

The fatal flaw in plaintiffs' argument is that they have not shown a question of material fact that defendant made any representations to them between 1997 and 2007 that they relied on to refrain from filing their claim for legal malpractice.

Conclusion

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the Koczors' legal malpractice claim was untimely and that the trial court did not err in denying their motion to reconsider.

Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court of Cook County.

Who won?

Gregory P. Melnyk prevailed in the case because the court found that the Koczors' claim was barred by the statute of repose and that they failed to establish grounds for equitable estoppel.

Defendant asserted that the statute of repose for plaintiffs' legal malpractice action expired on January 14, 2007, and the instant cause was untimely when filed on February 13, 2009.

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