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Keywords

defendantattorneystatuteimmigration law
defendantattorneystatuteimmigration law

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Kooritzky v. Herman

Facts

Kooritzky, an immigration law attorney, commenced an action pro se against the Secretary of Labor, challenging the promulgation of an interim final rule by the Department of Labor that terminated the right of employers to substitute one immigrant applicant for another in the labor certification process. After prevailing on the merits, Kooritzky sought to recover attorney fees from the Department, asserting that he received assistance from other attorneys and a law clerk, none of whom had entered an appearance on his behalf during the merits phase of the case.

Kooritzky, an immigration law attorney, commenced an action pro se against the Secretary of Labor, challenging the promulgation of an interim final rule by the Department of Labor that terminated the right of employers to substitute one immigrant applicant for another in the labor certification process. After prevailing on the merits, Kooritzky sought to recover attorney fees from the Department, asserting that he received assistance from other attorneys and a law clerk, none of whom had entered an appearance on his behalf during the merits phase of the case.

Issue

Whether a pro se attorney-litigant is entitled to recover attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).

Whether a pro se attorney-litigant is entitled to recover attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).

Rule

The fee-shifting provision of EAJA does not allow recovery of attorney fees for work done by an attorney acting pro se, as established by the Supreme Court in Kay v. Ehrler.

The fee-shifting provision of EAJA does not allow recovery of attorney fees for work done by an attorney acting pro se, as established by the Supreme Court in Kay v. Ehrler.

Analysis

The court applied the rule by determining that the reasoning in Kay v. Ehrler, which held that the word 'attorney' assumes an agency relationship, precludes recovery of attorney fees for work done by an attorney acting pro se. The court found that the fee-shifting provision of EAJA does not differ materially from the statutes construed in Kay and Burka, thus overruling its previous decision in Jones v. Lujan.

The court applied the rule by determining that the reasoning in Kay v. Ehrler, which held that the word 'attorney' assumes an agency relationship, precludes recovery of attorney fees for work done by an attorney acting pro se. The court found that the fee-shifting provision of EAJA does not differ materially from the statutes construed in Kay and Burka, thus overruling its previous decision in Jones v. Lujan.

Conclusion

The court reversed the district court's award of attorney fees to Kooritzky, concluding that he was not entitled to recover attorney fees under the EAJA as a pro se attorney-litigant.

The court reversed the district court's award of attorney fees to Kooritzky, concluding that he was not entitled to recover attorney fees under the EAJA as a pro se attorney-litigant.

Who won?

The defendant, Secretary of Labor, prevailed in the case because the court held that a pro se attorney-litigant is not entitled to recover attorney fees under the EAJA.

The defendant, Secretary of Labor, prevailed in the case because the court held that a pro se attorney-litigant is not entitled to recover attorney fees under the EAJA.

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