Featured Chrome Extensions:

Casey IRACs are produced by an AI that analyzes the opinion’s content to construct its analysis. While we strive for accuracy, the output may not be flawless. For a complete and precise understanding, please refer to the linked opinions above.

Keywords

settlementdamagesattorneysummary judgmentwrongful termination
litigationattorneyappealwrongful terminationsustained

Related Cases

The Florida Bar v. Spann, 682 So.2d 1070, 21 Fla. L. Weekly S330
View Case »
Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 231 Cal.App.3d 692, 282 Cal.Rptr. 627
View Case »
Security National Bank of Sioux City, IA v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936, 92 Fed.R.Serv.3d 689
View Case »
Matter of Layton, Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.2d, 1993 WL 77191, 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 366
View Case »
Marks v. Intergraph Corp., Inc., 740 So.2d 1066
View Case »
Justia Law Link
LexisNexis Link
Westlaw Link
CourtListener Link
Oyez Link

Kourouvacilis v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 65 Mass.App.Ct. 521, 841 N.E.2d 1273

Facts

Diane Kourouvacilis retained attorney Louis Kerlinsky on a contingent fee basis for a wrongful termination case against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Monson State Hospital. Kerlinsky was suspended from practice for unethical conduct related to a separate case, which adversely affected Kourouvacilis's wrongful termination claim. After Kerlinsky's suspension, Kourouvacilis hired a new law firm, Cooley, Shrair, which settled the case for $50,000. Kerlinsky, P.C. then sought to enforce an attorney's lien against the settlement proceeds.

In November, 1985, Diane Kourouvacilis retained attorney Louis Kerlinsky on a contingent fee basis to represent her in an action against General Motors (GM) and Avis Rent–A–Car (Avis) for personal injuries she allegedly sustained when a GM automobile she had purchased from Avis caught fire while she was driving. Kourouvacilis subsequently retained Kerlinsky in November, 1987, for the litigation that underlies this appeal (again on a contingent fee basis) to represent her in a wrongful termination action against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Monson State Hospital (Monson) (collectively, the Commonwealth) in which she also alleged breach of the duty of fair representation against her union, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME).

Issue

Whether an attorney forfeits his right to a charging lien due to suspension for unethical conduct that harmed the client's case.

Whether an attorney forfeits, or waives, his right to an attorney's lien by engaging in unethical conduct harmful to his client's case that compels his withdrawal from the representation before the case is concluded is a question our appellate courts have not before addressed.

Rule

An attorney's misconduct that damages a client's action precludes the attorney from enforcing a charging lien, and the law firm is vicariously liable for the attorney's misconduct.

As a matter of first impression, attorney's misconduct damaged client's action and precluded attorney from enforcing attorney's lien, and law firm was vicariously liable for misconduct and precluded from enforcing attorney's lien.

Analysis

The court determined that Kerlinsky's unethical conduct was directly related to the case for which he sought to enforce the lien. His actions not only harmed Kourouvacilis's case but also violated professional conduct rules, which justified the denial of the lien. The court emphasized that the attorney's misconduct impaired the client's cause of action, thus barring recovery of fees.

On the facts of this case, we hold that disbarment or suspension of an attorney for ethical misconduct bars him from recovering compensation for legal services rendered prior to the disciplinary action—whether on a contingent fee agreement, in a quantum meruit action, or in a proceeding to enforce the statutory lien—when the penalized misconduct was (as here) related to the case in which the services were rendered and for which a fee is sought and impaired the value of the client's cause of action or otherwise imperiled the client's right to relief.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the summary judgment ruling that Kerlinsky, P.C. could not enforce the attorney's lien due to Kerlinsky's unethical conduct that prejudiced the client's case.

The Appeals Court, Laurence, J., held that: 1 as a matter of first impression, attorney's misconduct damaged client's action and precluded attorney from enforcing attorney's lien, and 2 law firm was vicariously liable for misconduct and precluded from enforcing attorney's lien. Affirmed.

Who won?

Cooley, Shrair, P.C. prevailed because the court found that Kerlinsky's misconduct precluded the enforcement of the lien.

Cooley, Shrair, ultimately settled that case for $50,000, receiving $20,000 for its efforts (whether on the basis of a contingent fee agreement or reasonable time spent being unclear from the record).

You must be