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Keywords

plaintiffdamagesmediationattorneyliabilitystatutemotionsummary judgmentmotion for summary judgment
plaintiffattorneyliabilitystatutemotionsummary judgmentmotion for summary judgment

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LAJIM, LLC v. General Electric Co., Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2015 WL 9259918, 82 ERC 1023

Facts

General Electric operated a plant in Morrison, Illinois, from 1949 to 2010, using chlorinated solvents that contaminated groundwater and soil. In 1986, chlorinated solvents were detected in municipal wells, leading to investigations and remediation efforts. The plaintiffs purchased the Prairie Ridge Golf Course in 2007, later discovering significant contamination levels in the groundwater, including TCE concentrations far exceeding safe limits. They filed suit against GE in 2013, seeking remediation and damages under various environmental statutes.

General Electric operated a plant in Morrison, Illinois, from 1949 to 2010, using chlorinated solvents that contaminated groundwater and soil.

Issue

Whether the plaintiffs' claims under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and other environmental statutes are barred by the Illinois Attorney General's prior enforcement action against General Electric.

Whether the plaintiffs' claims under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and other environmental statutes are barred by the Illinois Attorney General's prior enforcement action against General Electric.

Rule

Under RCRA, a citizen suit may be barred if the state has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under the same provisions of RCRA. The court must determine if the state action is equivalent to a citizen suit under RCRA.

Under RCRA, a citizen suit may be barred if the state has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under the same provisions of RCRA.

Analysis

The court analyzed the statutory language of RCRA, concluding that only a state suit brought under RCRA's imminent and substantial endangerment provision can bar a citizen suit. The court found that the Illinois Attorney General's action was based on state law, not RCRA, and therefore did not preclude the plaintiffs' federal claims. The court also noted that the state had not diligently prosecuted its case, further supporting the plaintiffs' position.

The court analyzed the statutory language of RCRA, concluding that only a state suit brought under RCRA's imminent and substantial endangerment provision can bar a citizen suit.

Conclusion

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on liability under RCRA while denying General Electric's motions regarding state law claims and the federal environmental claim. The court ruled that the plaintiffs could proceed with their claims against GE.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on liability under RCRA while denying General Electric's motions regarding state law claims and the federal environmental claim.

Who won?

The plaintiffs prevailed on the federal environmental claims, as the court found that General Electric's prior state law actions did not bar their RCRA claims.

The plaintiffs prevailed on the federal environmental claims, as the court found that General Electric's prior state law actions did not bar their RCRA claims.

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